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ABSTRACT
Lippmann (1922) theorized that we understand our world through elites and the media
because we cannot experience everything ourselves. We look to others to share their experiences
with us. In this way, the media and elites tell us what is important in our world. Converse (1964),
Zaller (1992), and Lupia (1994) argue that not only do elites and the media help us see what is
important, but they draw out attributes of these issues to help us make political determinations
congruent with our belief systems. In this thesis, I conduced two studies investigating candidate,
party, and White House tweets about the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
First, I used a quantitative content analysis to understand how in-parties, out-parties and
politicians communicated about the PPACA. I studied tweets from 2009, when the bill was in
Congress; in 2012, during an election year; and in 2015, at the start of another election cycle. I
observed that elites and media used the term “Obamacare” with affective cues to communicate
about the PPACA. The Democrats used positive tone when talking about the law, while the
Republicans used negative tone and oppositional language. I also noted that Democrats
linguistically reappropriated “Obamacare” to imbue it with positive cues for their base.
Next, I conducted to qualitative textual analysis to investigate how the White House
communicated about the healthcare policy priority. I began with emergent open coding of 10%
of the sample and used this to develop a quantitative code book to analyze the remaining 90%. I
developed a tactical category architecture with six categories of provision of information and
seven categories of propagandistic techniques.
I was able to show that widely used techniques in strategic communication are effective
in setting the agenda for the public. Parties, candidates, and the White House communicate what
issues are salient and help us toward value judgments of those issues in line with our ideologies.
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Twitter changes how tacticians practice. The brevity of tweets requires strategic use of language
to build the agenda and a savvy press to interpret those cues as they share the agenda with the
public.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
About a century ago, President Woodrow Wilson instituted the Committee on Public
Information (CPI) to help provide government information in the public’s interest. Instead, he
used this group as a propaganda machine to help advance his motivations in World War I.
Although disbanded after Wilson’s term, the CPI’s persuasive tactics remain residually in the
executive branch today (Greenberg, 2016). Around the same time, prolific scholar Walter
Lippmann (1922) argued that public information is widely shaped by media and the elites
because ordinary people do not have the time, ability, or interest to see and experience
everything in our world. Citizens rely on media and elites to present issues of the day in neat
packages. Later agenda-setting theory, framing theory, and priming theory show that affectively
cued messages not only help us understand, but help us form attitudes in line with our innate
ideologies. So how do politicians communicate about policy priorities? To understand this, I
conducted three studies. Each study explored communication through Twitter about President
Obama’s healthcare reform priority.
First, I considered how in parties and out parties and a lead characters in both
communicated about the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Specifically, I
wanted to understand the use of the cue “Obamacare”—where it originated, in what context it
was used, and what global circumstances it might be addressing. I wanted to understand if it was
a completely partisan word added to the lexicon with affective-cues tied to one party’s
sentiments. What I learned is that both parties used the term, but with vastly different meanings.
The GOP tied it to President Obama, who is unfavorable to their members, hence drawing
unfavorable cues. Alternatively, the Democrats pushed the connection to Obama, who has high
approval ratings among their members. They even began to explain their linguistic
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reappropriation by saying, “I’ve heard they call this Obamacare. And I’m ok with that, because I
do care. I care about you.” (White House, 2013, December 4). I will show through a quantitative
analysis that the term was used in negative tweets to oppose the out-party and in positive tweets
to support the in-party. For this thesis, the in-party was the Democrats, the party in power in the
executive branch during the timeframe of this study; thus, the out-party was the Republicans, the
party not in power in the executive branch. The term “Obamacare” took on an increasingly
aggressive posture as the years passed and the Obama administration won over public opinion
and the judiciary decided in favor of the law. Language and affective primes were critical to
what transpired in this study window.
The second study was a directed, inductive textual analysis of all White House tweets
relating to the healthcare reform policy priority between January 1, 2012 and December 31,
2015. I first employed emergent open-coding for 10% of the sample, then developed a qualitative
codebook based on these codes. I coded the remaining 90% of the sample with the codebook.
What emerged were six tactical categories that applied to provision of information for the public
good and seven tactical categories that applied to propaganda. Some of these categories broke
down into subcategories characterized by a particular tactic observed at least 6-10 times. From
this category architecture, I will show that, while the White House does provide information
related to the policy, much of the communication is, instead, propagandistic, applying tactics that
cue partisan agreement and appeal in broader, more ideological ways to audiences who have not
yet formed an attitude about the policy.
To understand the communication strategies being applied in these studies, we look to
almost a century of scholarship in political communication, public opinion, psychology, and
linguistics. Lippmann argued that we can’t see and experience everything there is to know for
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ourselves. We, therefore, rely on intermediaries—elites and the media—who can observe,
record, and report back to us what they have experienced and what it means (Lippmann, 1922).
Elites and the media construct a world for us based on what they know, and without our own
experiences, we accept their construction as our reality (McCombs, 2004).
Philip Converse (1964) extends Lippmann’s theory by exploring belief systems
constructed by elites and by the masses. He argues that we cognitively and intellectually function
in our world by relying on our web-like belief systems of married ideas and attitudes. Within
these belief systems, narrower ideologies inform our perception and views of our world and how
it should operate. These systems and ideologies operate on the basis of constraints, or the ability
to successfully predict, given some information about an attitude, other attitudes the person or
group may hold. While elites operate with a more abstract, sophisticated level of understanding
from which to draw ideas and attitudes, they often provide their information to less sophisticated
publics who have simpler understanding and fewer constraints. Elites learn about the masses
through individual informal conversations, mostly with others in the same elite group. Taken
together, these conversations help elites generalize to the masses. But, the masses tend to decide
issues on a personal, not ideological, level. When asked about issues, they have a difficult time
accurately recognizing terms and issues. So, the elites and the media frame complex contexts in
concrete, understandable packages.
Agenda-setting theory affirms Lippmann’s and Converse’s positions that the media help
us understand our world. Agenda-setting shows that the media may not tell us “what to think”
but are very good at telling us “what to think about” (Cutlip et al., 2006, 204). By the media’s
coverage (or lack of coverage) of a particular issue, the public gleans what is important. When
extended to framing and priming, we can see how the media and elites help guide the public to
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decisions based on characteristics of the issues. The media uses framing to select and give
importance to some attributes over others (Entman, 1993). The media and elites’ reports prompt
us to draw from our own political ideology and memory via priming; people then use these bits
of information to make political judgments (Baran & Davis, 2012). The public relies on these
primed cues and shortcuts to make decisions about the issues of the day (Converse, 1964; Lupia,
1994).
Further, John Zaller (1992) argues that we can only capture what is top of mind, because
we are not well informed. Our opinions are formed by environmental triggers and things that are
most important to us at the time. Adding what we understand from our constructed environment
to our existing preconceptions, we are able to form opinions. Priming cues help people place
what they learn from the media and elites into their existing value structures. Similarly, Arthur
Lupia (1994) makes the case for cues leading us to the same decisions we would otherwise make
if we were well informed. Lupia posits that these shortcuts are quick ways to tap into our innate
ideology.
When voters rely on political cues to make judgments, they often seek consistency in
their attitudes, so they seek out cues that will help them align new beliefs with old ones. They
seek out candidates with like attributes to make policy decisions that fall in line with their
existing ideological framework. On the other hand, cues help busy voters avoid the time- and
energy-consuming exercise of seeking out and attempting to understand complex information
about issues. Cues substitute burdensome information with helpful information that still allows
voters to arrive at the same destination (Conover, 1981).
This thesis explored the importance of emotive cues and language tactics on public
opinion, policy adoption, and attitude and behavior change through the White House’s healthcare
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reform policy priority. I considered communication through Twitter, a social networking tool
that requires the publisher to communicate in 140 characters or less. Given the timeframe for this
study, I chose to investigate Twitter for several reasons: the abbreviated nature of the content
allowed me to analyze a larger number of posts, including both incumbency and election years;
Twitter is the second-most popular social networking site in the United States; and Twitter is
projected to grow as mobile social networking platforms gain more users (Ad Week, 2015).
Additionally, Barack Obama was the first president to use Twitter (Greenberg, 2016).
Twitter provides an immediate and direct link between sender and recipient, so it allowed
the White House to connect more intimately with its 21.2 million followers. Twitter provides
some immediate feedback to the White House as citizens are able to retweet, like, or comment
about content delivered. Twitter also fulfilled some of the promises the Obama campaign made
for transparency and participatory democracy (“Introducing @POTUS”, 2012). Not only did
President Obama have his team establish the first executive office Twitter account, but he was
the first sitting president to use Twitter to connect directly with users through regular White
House Twitter chats.
Since the 2008 campaigns were the first in history to have new electronic media and
Internet overshadow traditional media (e.g., TV, radio, newspapers) (Hendricks & Denton,
2010), it is important for us to study how this platform was used to help the administration
succeed after the election was over. Unlike prior campaigns and executive offices, our evolving
online environment is providing both benefits to and higher expectations for candidates.
Webpages are no longer static places to drop campaign or policy information that stagnates.
Instead, our World Wide Web has become quite dynamic. Candidates and elected officials are
expected to provide more content that is responsive to global conditions and changing

5

circumstances. In exchange, it provides a great venue for immediate response to feedback from
constituents (Hendricks & Denton, 2010).
This thesis will not just pull back the curtain for constituents who want to better
understand how their government and elected officials communicate with them, it will also be
very beneficial for nonprofits and government agencies who are tasked with implementing
important social policies with little ability to use paid media. My studies look exclusively at
earned media—media attention that is not purchased, but instead, is earned because it is
compelling and newsworthy. I wish to better understand how free platforms can maximally
contribute to securing policy adoption through attitude and behavior change.
We will see classic strategic communications practices at work here. Just as they are
effective in corporate America for selling products and services, maintaining the reputations of
business people, and building strong relationships with stakeholders and investors, they are just
as effective in advancing important policy priorities. White House Twitter strategies to overcome
initial unpopularity and opposition to the law and to turn the tide of public opinion toward policy
adoption can also be applied to other important social challenges. For example, we could use
these strategies to persuade people to wear seatbelts or use the proper car seat for their children,
to encourage people to be tested to know their HIV/AIDS status, or to encourage people to stop
using tobacco products. Nonprofits can use these strategies to ask people to donate to food
pantries, to encourage people to volunteer for community clean-up days, and to help people
understand mental illness.
For this reason, I did not make value judgments here about these tactical approaches. As I
will explain later, I classified some communication as providing information for the public good
and some communication as propagandistic. I do not argue that one is ethically better than the
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other, but instead just deconstructed the communication into tactics that communicators can
reapply not only to political challenges, but to broader societal issues. I am not concerned if I am
more successfully persuaded to get my flu shot by a dump of facts and figures, or by a contest, or
the endorsement of a celebrity. What’s important is that I get the shot. Similarly, I elucidated
how communicators and strategists worked to communicate about and overcome the initial
negative public opinion about the PPACA, but kept focused on how they achieved the goal
without making value judgments about the goal itself.
I hope this thesis will be a good guide for communications practitioners who work
exclusively in earned media. Many social issues do not have the benefit of a hefty
communications budget, but are no less important. In fact, arguably they are more important than
sale of commercial products and services because they impact social good and social welfare. I
want this work to help them be more effective for the benefit of humanity at large.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
As with much mass communication and public opinion knowledge, agenda-setting theory
has its roots in Walter Lippmann’s assessment of how we render judgments. Lippmann argued
that we are not sophisticated enough to understand the intricacies of our vast global society. We
can’t see and experience everything there is to know for ourselves. We rely on intermediaries—
elites and the media—who can observe, record, and report back to us what they have
experienced and what it means (Lippmann, 1922). The media create a pseudo-environment based
on their assessment of the issues and actors, and we acquiesce, allowing that environment to
become our reality in the absence of our own experiences (McCombs, 2004). If Lippmann is
right, then the media set the tone for our awareness and knowledge of the world because we rely
on the media to gather information about the world and to bring it to us in neat packages.
Agenda-setting Theory
Agenda-setting theory affirms and extends Lippmann’s concept of public acceptance of
media reporting as a representative look at the world. It explains how the public makes decisions
about what issues are important, and when extended to framing and priming, explains how the
media help guide the public to decisions based on characteristics of the issues. Early scholars,
like Bernard Cohen (1963), followed in Lippmann’s steps positing that, while the media may not
succeed in influencing attitude change or attitude development, it is very successful at helping to
focus the public on what issues deserve the most of their attention. Kurt and Gladys Lang (1983)
took this one step further arguing that the public’s perceived weight of issues is directly
proportional to the amount the media has emphasized the issue. There are strong, mediated
effects between news reports and what people think is important (Baran & Davis, 2012). “The
media are the major primary sources of national political information; for most, mass media
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provide the best—and only—easily available approximation of ever-changing political realities”
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 185).
Conservatively, agenda-setting theory shows limited effects on how much the agenda
impacts personal opinions and attitudes (Cutlip et al, 2006). But, Maxwell McCombs and Donald
Shaw (1972), who are credited with the formal development of this theory through empirical
study, take this a step further by showing over twenty-five years of research that the media affect
both cognitions and attitudes. Cognitions are what a person “knows, thinks and believes” (Shaw,
1977, 101). On the other hand, attitudes are “their likes and dislikes, pros and cons regarding
political, economic, and social matters” (Shaw, 1977, 96).
Agenda-setting theory is a continuing field of growth. More than 400 studies have been
published since McCombs and Shaw’s original 1972 article, and many subfields are emerging
(McCombs, 2004).
McCombs and Shaw, both faculty at the University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill,
began by studying 100 voters’ articulated “most important issues” for the 1968 presidential
campaign via personal interviews. The participants were selected at random from the area’s
registered voters and were filtered so interviews were only conducted with those voters who had
not yet made a final decision about how they would vote. The sample was representative of
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, in terms of race, socioeconomic status, and social standing.
Researchers used a single community to control all other variables.
To show media effects, McCombs and Shaw then conducted a content analysis of the
news. The researchers focused on content published or aired one week prior to the start of
interviews through the interview period on all sources identified through a pre-test administered
in Chapel Hill almost six months prior to the start of the study. The researchers identified fifteen
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key issues that were critical in the election and that were featured prominently in formal media
content. They also organized content by major or minor feature depending on location in the
newspaper or sequence in the newscast and length of the story or segment.
McCombs and Shaw determined that most of the media coverage was not about the
issues, but instead, was about the campaigns. The media heavily covered polling, campaign
events, campaign analysis, and candidate criticisms of one another.
The researchers found a strong, positive Pearson correlation (r = +.967) between
articulated importance of issue and media coverage of the issue. McCombs and Shaw observed
that what voters identified as the most salient issue tended to be based on composite news
exposure, suggesting that voters do attend to all news, not just the reports about their preferred
issue or candidate.
Because studying the effects in composite media exposure tended to hide individual
differences, the researchers separated out about half of the respondents who had not made a
definitive choice of candidate, but who had leanings toward one or another. To further
investigate, McCombs and Shaw ran Pearson’s correlations on articulated salient issues by the
respondent’s party affiliation against composite news coverage. This statistical study would
show whether individuals selectively consume media that matches their views. If selective
attention was not in play, we would see evidence for agenda setting at work instead.
“Considering both major and minor news coverage, 18 of 24 possible comparisons show
voters more in agreement with all the news rather than with news only about their own
party/candidate preference. This finding is better explained by the agenda-setting function of the
mass media than by selective perception” (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 182). Conversely, selective
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perception shows the central influence to be the individual, and the media are selectively parsed
to support the individual’s existing opinions (McCombs, 2004).
Finally, McCombs and Shaw calculated Pearson’s correlations between each news source
and every other news source. They observed several trends: the highest correlations were seen in
like media, high correlations across the board showed relative use of common news values, and
highest correlations for major news items suggested relative consensus in what stories were
important. McCombs and Shaw were also able to show that high affect is correlated with low
openness to new information by gauging affect in the interview.
McCombs and Shaw continued their investigation with a similar study of the 1972
presidential election. They researched the issues salient to voters in Charlotte, North Carolina, at
three times in the summer and early fall prior to the election. They only considered content in the
Charlotte Observer and television networks. They determined that the newspaper was an
influencer at the very beginning of the fall campaign season; it determined which issues were
important to voters. Television did not show an impact during any of the intervals studied.
McCombs and Shaw determined that the seven salient issues in the election were swayed by
heavy media exposure of these topics (McCombs, 2004).
Further replication continued in an advanced study McCombs and Shaw initiated during
the 1976 presidential election. They branched out to three communities with varying average
socioeconomic statuses across the Northeast and upper Midwest. This study was longer; the
researchers interviewed panels of voters nine times during an eleven-month period. They
simultaneously conducted content analyses of the three national television networks and all local
newspapers in each of the three cities. As they found in the 1972 studies, the influence was
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strongest at the beginning of the election cycle when voters were still somewhat malleable and
were just beginning to pay attention to the upcoming election.
In order to adequately compare salience for changing issues in new elections and varying
communities, McCombs and Shaw used correlation statistics to compare whether there was a
relationship between voters’ articulated salient issues—the public agenda—and the issues that
received the most coverage—the media agenda. The researchers found a strong positive
correlation between the media agenda and the public agenda in television coverage at the
beginning of the election year. They found a weak positive correlation between the public
agenda and newspaper coverage at the beginning of the election year. Effects weakened as
Election Day approached and diminished after Election Day passed.
With correlation statistics they were also able to most definitively discredit the idea that
the media agenda is influenced by the public agenda, which was the theory of many of
McCombs and Shaw’s critics. No significant correlations were found in studying the degree to
which the public may be swaying the media, and in each case, the correlation between media
agenda influencing public agenda was far stronger than the correlation between public agenda
influencing media agenda.
The agenda-setting theory was further supported by a variety of later studies. In one
investigation, researchers looked at the public’s response to news that was overexposed—
covered too frequently or too prominently—as compared to the actual impact of the issue. The
public developed a false sense of concern because of the coverage despite the issue itself having
never changed or having improved (McCombs, 2004).
It is important to note that, while McCombs and Shaw conducted the seminal studies on
U.S. presidential elections, agenda-setting effects are not limited to this arena only. In
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subsequent studies, researchers have shown the same effect in countries around the globe and
with specific issues deeper than a broad presidential campaign. More recent studies have even
been able to show the same effects with online news and campaign content (McCombs, 2004).
While researchers observed variation in issue salience, they also observed variation in the
attributes of the policies and people in elections. “Agenda setting is a theory about the transfer of
salience, both the salience of objects and the salience of their attributes” (McCombs & Shaw,
1993, 62).
One final note from these historical, seminal studies is important: the media agenda did
not supersede personal experience. Media content could not overcome positive or negative
personal history with a candidate or policy (McCombs, 2004).
Agenda-setting theory accounts for strong media effects. Researchers have shown the
effects are direct, somewhat uniform and powerful (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). They were not
able to show immediacy, however, or to show impact to attitudes beyond cognitions (Shaw,
1977; McCombs, 2004). Eugene Shaw (1977) claims that people only selectively attend to media
messages and those who pay more attention to the media than their peers become the influencers
who share information with others. Therefore, attitude change comes as a result of peer
influence, not news coverage.
Need for Orientation
Agenda-setting can be seen as anchored in Needs and Gratifications Theory (Shaw,
1977). The media satisfies needs for information, learning, sharing with others, and being “in the
know.” Needs and gratifications seemed to be the antecedent to news-seeking behavior. Perhaps
most important is the need for orientation with the world (Shaw, 1977). “In the realm of public
affairs, the greater an individual’s need for orientation, the more likely he or she is to attend to
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the agenda of the mass media with their wealth of information on politics and government. This
concept also identifies the issues that are most likely to move from the media agenda to the
public agenda” (McCombs, 2004, 66).
We observe particular emphasis on the concept of need for orientation because it
provides a psychological explanation for agenda setting (Swanson, 1988). Mass communication
provides people with a “high need for orientation about politics,” a way not only to learn about
the issue, but also a way to call upon predispositions to make determinations (McCombs and
Shaw 1993). Increased news coverage not only increased salience, but primed attributes as
characteristics for judgment that sometimes generalizes to the whole policy or the politician’s
whole performance (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, 1991).
While on the surface, agenda-setting theory may seem straightforward—what the media
cover is what the public sees as important—a number of researchers are concerned with the
deeper causes of these tendencies. “According to a memory-based model, judgments and attitude
formation are directly correlated with “the ease in which instances or associations could be
brought to mind” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 208; Scheufele, 2000, 299). “Political issues that
are most salient or accessible in a person’s memory will most strongly influence perceptions of
political actors and figures” (Scheufele, 2000, 300).
Some researchers have chosen to further explicate the concept of salience. In McCombs
and Shaw’s initial studies, salience meant an issue was important to the public. Over time,
however, salience has been shown to involve both importance and accessibility of understanding
and conceptualization (Weaver, 2007). Thus, two competing theoretical approaches emerged.
Accessibility could mean just processing information as it is initially received. It could also,
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however, refer to information processing that is ongoing and relies on both drawing from stored
ideation and adding new information as it is received and processed (Scheufele, 2000).
Agenda-Setting and Framing
While first-level agenda setting involves “what to think about”—objects—second-level
agenda setting and framing involves “how to think about it”—attributes (Weaver, 2007). Media
influence both the importance of the object and which attributes of the object are important. This
second level carries a means by which people assess relative positivity and negativity of the
attribute (Baran & Davis, 2012).
Second-level agenda setting is linked to framing theory. Framing is the way the media
chooses to expose and discuss some attributes of an object while not discussing others. A frame
is “the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the
issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (Tankard, 1991, 3).
Framing is also used to provide shortcuts in the form of “images, metaphors, catchphrases,
taglines” and the like to explicate the attributes of an object. These shortcuts can be used by both
the media and by communicators to summon individuals’ deep ideological framework (Weaver,
2007). Agenda-setting and priming work by making issues more salient; framing works by
helping us make sense of incoming information (Weaver, 2007, 143). “Framing can be
considered an extension of agenda setting as it “is the selection of a restricted number of
thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is
discussed” (McCombs, 1997, 6; Scheufele, 2000, 297).
Agenda-Setting and Priming
Priming is the tendency for news reports to prompt individuals to draw from their
political ideology and memory and use these bits of information to make political judgments
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(Baran & Davis, 2012). Priming supports the views Lippmann, Converse, and Zaller had that
political sophistication among ordinary citizens is low and that people cannot know and
experience everything about every issue. Instead, they rely on cues and shortcuts.
Priming is a consequence of agenda setting. Priming allows individuals to make
judgments about issues based on characteristics tied to the policy or candidate involved (Weaver
et al., 1975; Weaver, 2007). While agenda setting makes issues more salient, priming makes
characteristics of the issues more salient in order that they be used to form attitudes. Individuals’
use this understanding of what is salient later when they receive news stories with cues. Agendasetting is often seen as involving cognitions, but priming is often attributed to attitude formation
(Weaver, 2007). The “alliance of priming and agenda setting has strengthened the theoretical
base of agenda-setting effects by providing a better understanding of how the mass media not
only tell us ‘what to think about’ but also ‘what to think’’’ (Cohen, 1963; Weaver, 2007, 145).
Priming helps to activate existing, well-formed beliefs by adding emphasis and altering
the salience of issues. Cues, bits of information that help individuals make decisions in line with
their ideology, typically fall into two non-mutually exclusive categories. Performance- and
personality-related cues prime the image of candidates or elected officials. Priming for issues
typically involves trying to elevate the importance of an issue(s) over others (Drunkman &
Jacobs, 2013).
Agenda Setting, Framing, Priming, Politics, and Practitioners
Scheufele articulates a three-step process for agenda setting that begins with agendabuilding, whereby an object is cast into sustained media attention and is tied to a common
understanding of an issue. Agenda-building is elite influence operating on the media. “This
formulation of the process of agenda building, then, attributes a key role both to mass media for
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initially picking up an issue and to political actors for keeping an issue prominent in the media
agenda or even increasing its prominence” (Scheufele, 2000, 303). This leads to agenda setting,
whereby the media communicate that issue to the public; this step is typically taken when the
public agenda comes to mirror the media agenda. Finally, the agenda’s attributes come together
to influence judgments of government, policies, and politicians through priming.
Framing follows a similar construct based on three steps—frame-building, frame-setting,
and consequences of framing—such that elites influence the media who frame the people and
issues covered. Audience frames come to resemble the media frames to which the public was
exposed. “At least five factors may potentially influence how journalists frame a given issue:
social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups,
journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists” (Scheufele, 2000,
307).
Cutlip and colleagues note that individuals’ interpersonal conversations also impacted the
agenda-setting effect if the outcome of those conversations conflicted with the media (Cutlip et
al., 2006). Media effects also change for issues people have directly experienced. Media effects
are least powerful with people who have direct experiences with the object (Cutlip et al., 2006).
Agenda-setting has helped us understand media effects in better identifying the time and
placement that has most impact. Media effects are most powerful at the beginnings of campaigns
(Cutlip et al., 2006). Lead stories have the strongest effects (Baran & Davis, 2012). Highly
dramatic stories have lesser effects than expected (Baran & Davis, 2012). These are practical
applications for communicators and media wishing to garner the desired attention at a critical
juncture with the public.

17

More work is to be done in the socio-psychological sphere to understand underlying
causes of agenda setting’s effects and dig deeper into attitudes, not just cognitions. Some of this
may lead naturally into a better definition of salience, or at least, one that can be universally
adopted. Currently, researchers define salience in many ways—for some it is what is top of
mind, for others it is importance, for others it is accessibility within memory or ideology, and
still others define it as attention to or awareness of a topic, which can be two definitions in itself
(Takeshita, 2006, 277).
Emotion and Reason
We would quickly put to rest relentlessly contentious issues if their meanings were based
in facts; instead, the meanings are subjective to one’s perspective and life experiences. There is
rarely consensus around facts and their meanings (Edelman, 1988). “There are multiple realities
because people differ in their situations and their purposes” (Edelman, 1988, 6). This may
explain how, as I will show later, Obama was able to linguistically reappropriate “Obamacare” to
rally supporters. “At extraordinary moments, campaigns can exercise…’performative power,’
influence over other actors’ definitions of the situation and their consequent actions through
well-timed, resonant, and rhetorically effective communicative action and interaction” (Kreiss,
2014, 3; Reed, 2013).
Those whose careers depend on public affairs, advocacy, and attention to the news
“constitute an avid audience for the political spectacle. For them there are weekly, daily,
sometimes hourly triumphs and defeats, grounds for hope and for fear, a potpourri of happenings
that mark trends and aberrations, some of them historic” (Edelman, 1988, 6). But for most,
public affairs are irrelevant or uninteresting, and civic engagement is not a priority. “Regimes
and proponents of political causes know that it takes much coercion, propaganda, and the
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portrayal of issues in terms that entertain, distort, and shock to extract a public response of any
kind” (Edelman, 1988, 7). Sadly, this exists despite widespread literacy, connectedness to others,
and boundless accessible information (Edelman, 1988).
“Every instance of language and action resonates with the memory, the fear, or the
anticipation of other signifiers, so that there are radiating networks of meaning that vary with the
situations of spectators and actors” (Edelman, 1988, 10). These subjective, ideological
perceptions, varying based on social circumstance and life experience, become the so-called facts
of the spectacle. These alleged facts are used to reinforce and continue ideologies, but both are
based in subjective understandings. Each generate “points of view and therefore of perceptions,
anxieties, aspirations, and strategies” (Edelman, 1988, 10)—they generate meanings that shape
each person’s political reality. “The uses of all such terms in specific situations are strategies,
deliberate or unrecognized, for strengthening or undermining support for specific courses of
action and for particular ideologies” (Edelman, 1988, 11).
Priming, Politics, and Practitioners
When voters rely on political cues to make judgments, they may behave rationally or
irrationally. On the one hand, people seek consistency in their attitudes, so they seek out cues
that will help them align new beliefs with old ones. They seek out candidates with like attributes
to make policy decisions that fall in line with their existing ideological framework. On the other,
cues help busy voters avoid the time- and energy-consuming exercise of seeking out and
attempting to understand complex information about issues. Cues substitute burdensome
information with helpful information that still allows voters to arrive at the same destination
(Conover, 1981). “Symbols become that facet of experiencing the material world that gives it a
specific meaning… The language, rituals, and objects to which people respond are not abstract
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ideas. If they matter at all, it is because they are accepted as basic to the quality of life”
(Edelman, 1988, 8). Signs are effective because of the context in which they are experienced
(Edelman, 1988).
Conover theorized that “voters develop stereotypes or ‘implicit theories’—structures of
related attributes or expectations—concerning various types of political figures. These
stereotypes are then used to fill in information about the candidates. In effect, using available
information a voter may attribute a characteristic to a candidate. Subsequently, this characteristic
may act as a cue in the sense that the voter infers additional candidate traits or issue positions
which are related to the cue according to his or her stereotype” (Conover, 1981, 432). So, there
are two components to cueing—the cue and the stereotype. Each have both image and policy
dimensions. Though any attribute can become a cue, those most central to one’s ideology draw
more inferences, and so, become most important. (Conover, 1981).
Lakoff (1980, 2002) extends this theory of cues and symbols when he speaks of
metaphors, which help us to define and experience one thing in terms of another. He argues that
our conceptual processes are built on a series of metaphors that define our everyday
understanding of the world. If we are strategically focused on one comparison, we are prevented
from focusing on another. In this way political communication can intentionally hide some
elements while exposing others. Drawing back to agenda-setting theory, Lakoff argues that
metaphors help to shape our realities based on how they are constructed, which can be
manipulated. Just as Lippmann argued that we have don’t have direct experience of everything in
our world and look to elites to fill in the gaps, Lakoff argues that because we understand
concepts based on other concepts there are very few things we understand directly (Lakoff,
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1980). “We conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated”
(Lakoff, 1980, 59).
Lakoff goes further to claim that “rationality is therefore imaginative by its very nature”
because our reasoning involves the entanglement of so many metaphors for which we do not
have direct experience (Lakoff, 1980, 193). Metaphors provide frames that allow us to
understand and create our worldview (Lakoff, 2002). They provide the basis for our reasoning
because metaphors provide structure for our ideas and concepts (Lakoff, 2002). Thus, metaphors
allow us to make unconscious decisions based on the framing of our conceptions of reality.
Drew Westen (2007) takes this one step further, arguing that specifically, emotion and
affectively loaded cues, help us make most decisions. We do not make decisions in a rational
way, but instead, operate in “bounded rationality,” whereby we take mental shortcuts to make
decisions (Westen, 2007, 29). Our thinking and emotion are inextricably linked; primates show
an inability for one facet to operate properly without the other. In fact, he was able to show that
the brain shuts down when faced with threatening information and reasons to emotionally biased
conclusions. (Westen, 2007). “The fact that someone or something holds any significance to us
at all means that it has emotional associations that generally become active along with any
thoughts of it, whether or not we are aware of them” (Westen, 2007).
Lakoff (2008) argues similarly that our thought processes are not rational. Eighteenth
century reason, based on premises of universality, disembodiment, logic, value-neutrality, and
interest-orientation, contribute a flawed understanding to how we make decisions (Lakoff, 2008).
We decide with both thinking and emotion; a lot of our decision making process is unconscious.
Lakoff posits that those who wish to persuade us should use frames—from frame analysis in
rhetorical studies versus framing theory in mass communication—to help audiences appreciate
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facts (Lakoff, 2008). Persuasion appeals to the complex narratives that are based on frames of
previous experience. “Narratives and frames have…integrated intellectual-emotional content; we
are all living out narratives” (Lakoff, 2008, 36). These oversimplifications of reality help us
arrive at conclusions more quickly and in line with our past preferences (Lakoff, 2008).
Social Construction
Edelman (1988) shows that “whether events are noticed and what they mean depend
upon observers’ situations and the language that reflects and interprets those situations”
(Edelman, 1988, 2), so we must be wary of what the elites and media present and how they
present it. We must also be mindful of possible manipulation caused by collusion of elites and
media, or caused as unintended consequences of unfiltered, unconstrained media content. “We
are acutely aware that observers and what they observe construct one another; that political
developments are ambiguous entities that mean what concerned observers construe them to
mean” (Edelman, 1988, 1).
Political scientists have not only addressed the notion that we construct our sense of
reality based on social interactions and experiences. Many social scientists in a number of
disciplines have contributed to frame analysis in rhetorical studies which posits similarly that we
get a general understanding of the whole, and from it, we construct the parts based on our
personal experiences (Barlett, 1932). We cannot treat each new experience individually, but
instead we make sense of our world by drawing on the connections between things we are
experiencing now with things we have experienced in the past (Tannen, 1993). Linguists and
psychologists discuss schema (Tannen, 1993), which are comparable to Converse’s belief
systems (Converse, 1981) in that they are both characterizing automatic processes that rule our
thinking as long as our experiences follow expectations. We only start to think for ourselves
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when our expectations are not met (Tannen, 1993). Interestingly, this represents an individual
microcosm of Indexing Theory, wherein the media only begin to explore issues when elites
disagree (Bennett et al, 2007). Social science’s frame analysis supports Edelman’s and
Lippmann’s theories of politics through social construction. Both discuss our tendencies to
accept wholesale what media and elites are telling us about the world we cannot experience. Our
world is socially constructed.
Language and Emotion
Over the years, candidates and parties have made strategic use of words and phrases that
they have imbued with connotations, or that have previously implied connotations, to represent
key issues to their policy agendas. “Even the name applied to an issue can influence the salience
of certain points of view and the distribution of public opinion. Journalists covering the current
struggle over abortion agonize about what label to use for this issue because both of the terms
commonly used by participants—‘freedom of choice’ and ‘right to life’—are affectively loaded”
(McCombs & Shaw, 1993, 63).
These metaphors have deeply partisan cues hidden in their easily recalled turns of phrase.
Voters on either side of the political continuum, even if they are not sophisticated, know
immediately how to vote on these issues to remain within party preferences. These metaphors
empower voters to be—just as Lippmann described them—unsophisticated and uninformed, but
allows the candidates and parties to correctly persuade them nonetheless.
Conservative candidates and the Republican Party have demonstrated success creating
terms with built-in connotations in order to connect issues they oppose with negative ideas or
characters. In 2007, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) was coined
“Obamacare” almost concurrently by a right-leaning journalist and would-be politician and by a

23

healthcare lobbyist in order to connect it to President Obama, who was viewed very unfavorably
by Republicans. Mitt Romney was the first politician to use the term just a few months after it
was first used. The use of “Obamacare” became so universal that it is now used by the media to
represent the PPACA because of pervasive public use of the term.
The Power of Language in Priming Cues
“Armed force may keep people in a state of unwilling subjugation for years, even for
generations. Only through language, however, can human understanding itself be manipulated
and people brought to cooperate in their own subjugation” (Green, 1987, ix). If one is
intellectually sophisticated and has access to information, however, language instead becomes
liberating.
Green paints a stark picture of how easily and unknowingly the public can be driven to
the will of the political agent. He reflects Lippmann and Converse in their warning that most are
not politically sophisticated or inclined, so they rely on a few key terms that cue basic
understanding, attitudes based on predispositions and ideology, and form the basis for their
perception of public affairs. “Whoever shapes public understanding of the labels thereby shapes
the nature of political discourse” (Green, 1987, ix).
Green argues that labels, or cues, are intentionally abstract so they are intriguing,
evocative, and ripe for reification on politicians’ terms. “Politicians are perpetually attempting to
infuse them with politically useful connotations” (Green, 1987, 2). Defining labels on the
politician’s terms is not an exercise of conveying accuracy or intellectualism, but instead is used
for the “evocation of a political response” (Green, 1987, 3). This reinforces the use of priming to
impact attitudes, not cognitions. “Political labels are image-laden, appealing as much to the
emotions as to the intellect” (Green, 1987, 2).
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Executive Communication
Arguably, while President Woodrow Wilson’s Committee on Public Information, the first
administration credited with leveraging communication to advance policy priorities, was
dismantled, residual tactical applications endured and are still in use to the present day. President
Nixon created a massive spin operation with a White House Office of Communication to
centralize messaging and communication; this group was also involved, however, in the
“development of elaborate media strategies to sell policies, nominations, and other initiatives to
the public” (Greenberg, 2016, 398-399). President Carter hired a team of pollsters and political
strategists (Greenberg, 2016, 403). President Regan relied on a “line of the day,” a strategy that
President Nixon had piloted, to generate sound bites based on strict use of talking points and
strategic messages (Greenberg, 2016, 410). During President George H. W. Bush term,
journalists were not troubled over covering news they knew was contrived (Greenberg, 2016,
417). President Clinton left no room to chance by establishing a War Room for rapid response to
media through quickly crafted messages (Greenberg, 2016, 419). President George W. Bush
employed heavy use of emotionally charged terms, like “axis of evil” and had some of the most
spectacular pseudoevents, including the “Mission Accomplished” speech which ignited a media
blitz around (and prematurely claimed) victory in Iraq (Greenberg, 2016, 433, 435). And finally,
President Obama bucked the trend to some extent by issuing information directly to the public
through social media, hiring a team to develop self-generated video content, and resurrecting a
digital transmission-based White House news service (Greenberg, 2016, 443).
How the Digital Age Impacts Communication
The advent of the Internet changed the modern history of information provision by the
executive branch. In 1995, the Clinton administration instituted policies for the nominal
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provision of executive information on the Internet (Shkabatur, 2015). Clinton encouraged the use
of technology for transparency by making available a limited number of executive documents
online. He also mandated that all executive agencies, utilize the Internet and information
technology in their interactions with the public. For example, with the help of multiple agencies
the website FirstGov.gov was created to provide an online portal for citizens to access
information about voting, travel, and immigration (“Adapter and Adopter,” 2015).
The George W. Bush administration built upon these efforts at improving government
transparency by instituting the E-government Act and Freedom of Information Act (Shkabatur,
2015). This act established a federal office for the sole purpose of promotion of government
e-resources. President Obama, much like his predecessor, continued to to advance the
accessibility and awareness of online government resources by issuing the Open Government
Directive (Evans & Campos, 2013), which mandated that all federal agencies must be
transparent in their operations. Moreover, this mandate determined that issues of transparency
would be evaluated by the administration over-time (Evans & Campos, 2013).
White House Office of Digital Strategy
The Obama administration is also credited with improving communication by the White
House by using online platforms like Youtube and Skype to engage in conversations with the
public, and more specifically, promote the website healthcare.gov (Wedell, 2016). Obama has
also been a proponent of using social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr to
communicate directives directly to the public (Eilperin, 2015). To this end, the administration
boasts the White House Office of Digital Strategy, a fourteen-member department that is
responsible for crafting and maintaining the president’s social media accounts (Eilperin, 2015).
The administration created the White House Office of Digital Strategy in 2009 when Obama
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took office, and has steadily expanded the number of platforms used, with announcements in
January 2016 that the White House would be using Snapchat (Ferguson, 2016). This department
is also credited with creating hundreds of online videos that explain the administration’s
perspective on issues ranging from immigration to bank regulation. These videos often highlight
major speeches like the State of the Union address (Ferguson, 2016). In this way, the White
House bypasses the news media – which has little incentive to air presidential remarks without
interpretation – by using social media.
Executive Use of Social Media to Communicate
Social media was originally developed to enable personal communication between
private individuals; its use has extended to corporations that use the medium to communicate
with customers and to promote products (Kaplan & Hainlein, 2010). Similarly, social media has
been used by non-profit organizations to spread membership information and to garner action
such as recruiting attendance at event rallies and fundraisers (Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012).
In politics, social media is used by political campaigns to signal information to potential
voters, fundraise, and recruit volunteers (Shirky, 2011). Social media has facilitated campaigns’
voter outreach; for example, platforms like Facebook and Twitter allow for immediate and
personalized interaction (Grant et al., 2010). Campaigns also use video services like Youtube,
Vine, and Vimeo to air political ads instead of buying costly air time. In the 2008 presidential
campaign, Republican nominee John McCain released a sixty-second online-only ad that
portrayed Obama as a celebrity by comparing him to the likes of Paris Hilton and Britney Spears.
Such so-called soft attack ads never find their way to television airwaves, but are designed for
online consumption (“A Look Back,” 2008).
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Social media have also been widely used by legislators and by government agencies
(Golbeck et al., 2010). Members of Congress use these platforms to communicate with their
constituents, to provide updates on legislation, or to highlight events or policies for selfinterested reasons (Golbeck et al., 2010). Platforms like Twitter allow for efficient
communication by reducing the costs associated with traditional means of communication (i.e.
postage, staff) with followers who may include constituents, private individuals, organizations,
and journalists (Kavanguh et al., 2012). Members of Congress use Twitter to provide information
regarding policy, relevant news articles, report on their daily activities, or personalize their image
(Golbeck et al., 2010). A recent study on Twitter use by members of Congress revealed that most
tweets were actually links to news articles or other web links (Glassman et al., 2009). What
characterizes this use of social media is that it is typically uni-directional: while members of
Congress use their Twitter feed to provide information, they respond to constituents less often
(Waters & Williams, 2011). In contrast, data suggest the White House uses Twitter to respond to
questions from Twitter users regularly (Rodgers, 2016).
Individual government agencies utilize social media in much the same manner as
politicians, by posting select information on activities, and by signaling policy priorities. While
the news media are the traditional recipients of government information, the White House now
uses social media, and Twitter specifically, to reach an audience that may not be tuning into
nightly television news broadcasts (Eilperin, 2015). Bypassing media to provide the public
information that emphasizes the administration’s policy priorities gives the executive the
advantage in framing issues and using language strategically (Hopper, 2015). However, many
call into question the premise that large numbers of Americans receive their information from the
likes of the White House blog, Twitter or Facebook profiles (Pew 2012, 2015a). The fact remains
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that the administration is using Twitter to reach individuals; whether the target audience is the
public or journalists is unclear (Aharony, 2012). Messner and Distaso (2008) find that news
outlets often use weblogs as legitimate news sources, which prompts Conwey and colleagues
(2013, pp. 1607) to speculate that “candidates could take advantage of microblogging in a way
that attracts the attention of the news media.” If presidential candidates could potentially use
social media messages to attract the attention of the press, then surely the same could apply to
the president once he or she is in office.
Critics have voiced concerns over the use of social media by government claiming that it
may increase “noise” or information overload, and fails to present a comprehensive, coherent
message to the public (Kavanaugh et al., 2012). They argue that individuals are not likely to be
able to effectively parse through the numerous social media accounts of individual government
agencies. Others have questioned whether individual government departments are equipped to
manage the staffing and technology required to use social media effectively (Criado et al., 2013).
The technological know-how of individuals managing government agency leaders is also
questionable (Oliveira & Welch, 2013). On the other hand, one could argue that social media
contributes to the mandate that agencies increase transparency in their operations (Bertot et al.,
2012; Chun et al., 2010; Mergel, 2013). Still, transparency is relative: federal agencies provide
information suitable for promotion, while the provision of such data may meet both public good
and self-interested goals. Altogether, government agencies are using social media to provide
information that they are willing to let the public see; this is not, however, necessarily the
information that the public seeks (Janssen, 2012).
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Elite Collusion with Media
When elites and policymakers agree, the press has difficulty intervening to report
contrary facts. It takes a break in agreement for the press to start exploring the issues more
deeply and exposing the truth behind the spin. The system of the free press is limited by elite
opinion. Obviously, influence of elites in the media can impact what events they cover and how
they cover them. Taken to an extreme, “the press has grown too close to the sources of power in
this nation, making it largely the communication mechanism of the government, not the people”
(Bennett et al, 2007, 1).
Public Opinion and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Public opinion about affordable healthcare is strongly tied to personal costs and impacts
to the nation’s economy and deficit. Initial passage of the bill relied heavily on the Congressional
Budget Office’s (CBO) estimation that the PPACA would reduce the deficit and cut healthcare
costs by almost $600 billion in the first ten years. A CBO estimation published two months after
the bill’s passage into law, however, shows projected increases in the federal deficit as a result of
the PPACA (Huntington et al, 2011).
The midterm election in 2010 was a referendum, of sorts, on the PPACA; the change of
majority in Congress was a clear indication that Americans were unhappy with the law, among
other issues. Approximately 55% of Americans favored repealing the law and President Obama’s
percentage approval on handling healthcare dropped to the mid-thirties. In fact, subsequent
retrospective study shows that for this issue, partisan public opinion was not in favor of enacting
this legislation from the beginning. The issue was heavily divided along demographic and party
lines. While about 76% of Democrats supported the PPACA, about 79% of Republicans opposed
it. Seniors over the age of 65 were more likely to oppose it than those age 18-29, whose support
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percentage was in the mid-sixties (Blendon & Benson, 2010). It seems that public attitudes did
not affect policy after all. (Huntington, 2011; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Page & Shapiro, 1992).
Broad, aggregate public opinion remained opposed to the PPACA (Huntington, 2011).
In 2012, polls showed that health care was the second most important issue for likely
voters in deciding their 2012 presidential vote (CBS–NYT, September 2012; HSPH–SSRS,
2012). This is the highest that health care has been ranked as a presidential election issue since
1992,” when the issue was introduced as a priority of the Clinton White House (CNN–NEP,
2008; Blendon et al., 2012).
In an average of the 27 polls related to healthcare leading into the 2012 election, a
majority of Americans did not approve of the law, despite the popularity of some of its
provisions. While most people believed the PPACA would be beneficial to underprivileged
groups, many believed the PPACA would have little positive impact for the economy or those
already insured. There are some clearly interwoven issues at play: provisions for abortion,
Medicare/Medicaid, and the aging (Blendon et al, 2013).
About 81% of respondents in an average of polls report that healthcare would be a very
important issue when they voted, however, only 24% chose it—or one of its interwoven issues—
as their top issue (Blendon et al, 2013; ABC–WP, July 2012; CBS–NYT, July 2012; Fox, 2012).
Those who identified healthcare and those who identified abortion as top issues fell on either
side of the ideological and party spectrum. Those who placed healthcare near the top of their list
of most important issues were likely to vote for Obama (Blendon et al, 2013).
During the initial roll-out of Obamacare in late 2013, the plan generally received negative
coverage on network news outlets (Media Matters, 2013) and cable news outlets (Wilstein,
2013). While negative in tone, the coverage focused on skepticism regarding how the plan would
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work and its eventual cost. Interviews with individuals working in the healthcare profession,
(i.e., managers, doctors) were prominently featured on newscasts. They claimed that Obamacare
would undoubtedly raise the price of medical premiums. Additionally, there were also interviews
of average citizens who claimed that Obamacare would either raise the cost of their own private
insurance or would result in higher taxes for everyone, as opposed to the cost savings being
touted by the president (Holland, 2013).
Despite negative coverage of the Affordable Care Act, public opinion and perception
were more mixed than was portrayed in the media. In the lead-up to the 2012 presidential
election, public opinion about the PPACA was strongly tied to perceived personal and economic
costs. Initial passage of the bill relied heavily on the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO)
estimation that the PPACA would reduce the deficit and cut healthcare costs by almost $143
billion in the first ten years and $1.2 trillion in the next decade (Huntington et al., 2011).
However, a CBO estimation published two months later showed projected $115 billion increase
in federal spending to account for provisions not initially included in their calculation
(Huntington et al., 2011), heightening healthcare anxieties at the polls. In fact, polls
demonstrated that health care was the second most important issue for likely voters in 2012, its
highest ranking since 1992 when the issue was introduced as a priority of the Clinton White
House (CNN–NEP, 2008; Blendon et al., 2012).
In a poll average, 81% of Americans considered the PPACA to be a very important issue
in their vote for president, and only 45% approved of the legislation as it was initially passed into
law (Blendon et al., 2012; ABC–WP, July 2012; CBS–NYT, July 2012; Fox, 2012). To add to
this tension, provisions in the PPACA related to abortion, Medicare/Medicaid, and the aging
(Blendon et al., 2012) increased the salience of healthcare in voters’ decision-making. Party
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identity is the single biggest predictor of whether or not someone approved of the law (Dugan,
2014). Public opinion about the PPACA was sharply divided along partisan lines.
Problems with the Affordable Healthcare Act continued through its implementation in
January 2014, and negative news coverage continued alongside it. A string of missteps and
mismanagement on the part of officials responsible for the rollout garnered much of the media’s
attention (Alter, 2014). Particularly, coverage discussed difficulties with signing up for
Obamacare and issues with navigation of and access to the website. The site was also plagued
with numerous technical difficulties as a result of various contractors being used to develop the
site without effective communication between them.
Republican political leaders were apt to seize upon the bad press to point fingers at
Obama for perceived policy failures. They claimed that the inability to effectively provide the
online interface was a signal that the whole plan was a debacle, and that massive amounts of
money had presumably been wasted on a program that did not work. Accordingly, the press
characterized the website failure as both indicative of conflict between the White House and
Congress, and also mismanagement by the Obama administration (Cohen, 2013). Analysis over
time shows that while coverage was negative and salient initially, it decreased in 2014 (Noyes,
2014).
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 1: DO POLITICAL PARTIES BRAND ISSUES
TO PROVIDE CUES TO THE PUBLIC?
Just prior to the passage of the Public Privacy and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Andy
Martin, a self-proclaimed investigative journalist and would-be GOP politician first used the
term “Obamacare” to characterize the healthcare reform solutions that were a hallmark of thenSenator Barack Obama’s presidential campaign platform. He used the term to threaten about the
prospect of an Obama presidency (Reeve, 2011). Sometime just afterward, Jeanne Schuete Scott,
a lobbyist working for the healthcare industry, used the term. (Her use of the term came in March
2007, so it is unclear whether she had submitted her publication for a deadline before or after
Martin had published his blog on February 8, 2007.) Scott predicted the popular issue healthcare
reform would have in the 2008 election and used a number of terms specific to a variety of
candidates and prospective candidates’ names before “care” (Reeve, 2011). Finally, Mitt
Romney used the term on May 30, 2007 (Reeve, 2011). Romney was the first mainstream
politician to use the term and began the GOP’s use of the term throughout the 2008 election
cycle. While public opinion broadly supported the PPACA when called by its formal name, the
use of “Obamacare” elicited high negatives despite popularity for many of the provisions.
Ironically, during the 2012 election cycle, the GOP nominated Governor Mitt Romney as
their presidential candidate. Romney was governor when Massachusetts’ passed a healthcare
reform bill in 2006 on which many claim the PPACA was based. Political practitioners on the
left linguistically reappropriated the term “Obamacare,” attaching affective cues to draw support
in favor their legislation.
The so-called pictures in our heads of our dynamic world are based in large part on the
perception and explanation of media and elites (Lippmann, 1922). With the influence of elites,
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the media establish some issues as more salient than others by what they include, exclude,
feature prominently, and feature most often. These salient issues are broad objects, but focusing
on the attributes of those objects, media and elites have shown an ability to influence the public’s
perceptions and attitudes about those attributes. They have even been successful in transferring
positive or negative characteristics about those issues to individuals or policies that are close to
the issue. The use of priming cues helps the public draw on their mental pictures, belief systems,
ideologies, and past experiences to develop attitudes; practitioners have been able to manipulate
those pictures by the loaded cues they use that draw connections, provide subtle implications,
and help the public determine how to vote.
Hypotheses
Party and ideology cues correlate to perceptions of candidates’ issue positions. Voters
assign positive characteristics and favor policy stances to candidates and elected officials who
share their political ideology. Likewise, they attribute negative traits and beliefs about those of
opposing ideology (Conover, 1981).
H1: Republican Party and candidate tweets will oppose the in-party Democrats to
discourage support of the PPACA.
H2: Republican Party and candidate tweets will mention in-party candidates, often
disliked by the Republican out-party, to discourage support of the PPACA.
“It is just as evident that individuals’ opinions on political issues change with…cues
about the probable future consequences of political actions” (Edelman, 1988, 3). Those who saw
Obama’s first term as bad, likely read into use of his name, negative connotations. Thus, in 2012,
when I saw the GOP begin to actively use the term “Obamacare” in Twitter, it could signal
disaster if you disagreed with his first-term policies or second-term priorities. “To criticize a
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policy by branding it with a ‘bad’ label is not to show detailed links between policy and outcome
but rather to evoke certain negative attitudes currently inhering in the label” (Green, 1987, 4).
H3: Republican Party and candidate tweets will use the and “affectively loaded”
(McCombs & Shaw, 1993, 63) word “Obamacare” to discourage support of the
PPACA.
Similarly, positive cues are expected to draw positive attitudes while negative cues are
expected to draw negative attitudes (Conover, 1981).
H4: Democrat Party and candidate tweets will skew positive in tone while Republican
Party and candidate tweets will skew negative.
“In particular, when people categorize themselves with respect to a particular attribute,
their distinctions between groups are typically made in ‘us-them’ terms. Consequently, more
positive characteristics are usually attributed to ‘in-group’ members, while inferences about the
‘out-group’—in contrast to balance theory predictions—are not necessarily negative (Hamilton,
1976)” (Conover, 1981, 435).
H5: Democrat Party and candidate tweets will skew toward supporting the Democrat inparty while Republican party and candidate tweets will skew toward opposing the
Democrat in-party.
H6: Democrat Party and candidate tweets will skew toward opposing the Republican
out-party while Republican party and candidate tweets will skew toward supporting
the Republican out-party.
Methods
I accessed 1,571 tweets using Topsy, an online Twitter archive service. I measured a twoweek period prior to Election Day—October 23 through November 6—in 2009, 2012, and 2015.
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When measuring non-election years, I maintained the same date range in order to control all nonvariables. De-archived tweets represented both parties and candidates. I grouped tweets into the
four categories I wished to compare: (1) Republican National Party tweets and Democratic
National Party tweets in 2009, when the PPACA legislation was being considered in Congress,
(2) Republican National Party tweets and Democratic National Party tweets in 2012, leading into
Election Day, (3) Barack Obama and Mitt Romney tweets in 2012 prior to Election Day, and (4)
Republican National Party tweets and Democratic National Party tweets in 2015, to investigate
use of priming today. The PPACA legislation passed the Senate December 24, 2009
I developed a quantitative code book to assess whether the tweet supported or opposed
the in- or out-party, whether the tone of the tweet was positive or negative, whether the Tweet
referenced a policy or candidate, and whether the tweet used a number of tactics: testimonials,
numerical statistics, or the term “Obamacare.” I coded all tweets on whether they referenced
affordable healthcare or the PPACA legislation, and then further coded tweets that did mention
healthcare against the full codebook. I only coded the text in the tweet itself, and did make
determinations about the tweet from included links; in many instances, these links no longer
have content or they have been redirected to pages that have been built since the time of the
tweet. I also only coded tweets in English; it is of note that Obama was the only candidate or
party to tweet in another language (Spanish). I coded all tweets as to whether they were originals
or retweets to determine origins of positive and negative content and to observe differences
between candidate and party accounts, which may have been managed differently. I coded for
the tone of the tweet using a positive, negative, neutral, and balanced scoring system where
positive indicates that one is inclined to support the PPACA, negative indicates that one is
inclined to oppose the PPACA, neutral does not provide enough information to make a
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judgment, and balanced gives both positive and negative information. I also coded for support
and opposition. Examples of support tactics included evidence of bipartisanship, attribution of
success to that party’s initiatives, or claiming or forecasting success for that party’s work.
Examples of opposition tactics included blaming for failure or expected failure, anticipation of
negative consequences, and use of charged language, like calling the PPACA an “experiment.” I
then ran descriptive statistics to calculate mean use of each tactic, which was coded as nominal
data.
For the party data set, some tweets included both support for the in-party and opposition
for the out-party. For this thesis, “in-party” refers to the Democrats who occupied the presidency
throughout the timeframe of this study; “out-party,” therefore, refers to the Republicans.
Analysis
H1 was supported with increasingly opposition-driven content in-party accounts as the
years advanced. In 2009, 49.35% of the Republican Party tweets related to healthcare opposed
the in-party. Of Republican Party tweets related to healthcare issued in 2012, 66.67% opposed
the in-party. All of the Republican Party tweets related to healthcare in 2015 opposed the inparty. None of Mitt Romney’s tweets referenced healthcare in 2012.
H2 was supported, and the use of in-party candidate names to connote negatives even
morphed over time to reflect H3. For 2009 Republican Party tweets related to healthcare, 55.84%
referenced an in-party candidate. The bulk of these mentions were of Rep. Nancy Pelosi, who
pushed the PPACA bill in Congress and was eligible for reelection as Speaker of the House at
the time. Pelosi supported comprehensive healthcare reform at a time when even the White
House thought passage of such a complete bill was impossible. All of the 2012 Republican Party
healthcare-related tweets mentioned President Obama. In 2015, none of the Republican Party
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tweets mentioned Obama, but all of them used the label “Obamacare.” None of Mitt Romney’s
tweets referenced healthcare in 2012.
H3 was supported after initial passage of the PPACA. Use of the affectively loaded term
“Obamacare” began on Twitter in 2012. Of the 2009 healthcare-related, Republican Party tweets,
none used the term “Obamacare.” In both 2012 and 2015, all of the Republican Party’s
healthcare-related tweets used the term “Obamacare.” As mentioned previously, Mitt Romney
did not tweet about healthcare in 2012.
H4 was supported. The Democrat Party did not tweet about the PPACA in 2009. In 2012,
83.33% of the healthcare-related Democrat Party tweets were positive. Of the 2015 Democrat
Party healthcare related tweets, only 40% were positive. In contrast, in 2009, only 10.39% of the
Republican Party tweets related to healthcare were positive. None of the Republican Party tweets
related to healthcare issued in 2012 or 2015 were positive.
H5 was supported. In 2009, the Democrat Party did not tweet about the PPACA. In 2012,
however, 83.33% of the Democrat Party tweets related to healthcare (3.55% of total) lent support
to the in-party. In 2015, 40% of the healthcare-related Democrat Party tweets (5% of total)
supported the in-party. It is of note that the remaining 40% opposed the out-party and 20% were
informative and neutral. Candidate Obama’s healthcare-related tweets (2.50% of total) supported
the in-party 70.59% of the time. Conversely, 49.35% of the Republican Party healthcare-related
tweets in 2009 (77% of total) opposed the in-party. In 2012 and 2015, all healthcare-related
Republican Party tweets opposed the in-party. Candidate tweets cannot be measured because
Romney did not tweet about healthcare, but Obama’s tweets supported the in-party 70.59% of
the time (of 2.50% of total).

39

H6 was supported. I cannot compare the Democrat Party’s 2009 tweets because they did
not issue any related to healthcare, but the Republican Party’s 2009 tweets related to healthcare
(77% of total) supported the out-party 14.29% of the time. In 2012, 16.67% of the Democrat
Party’s healthcare-related tweets (3.55% of total) opposed the out-party, while none of the
Republican Party’s healthcare-related tweets supported the out-party. Of the Democrat Party’s
2015 tweets related to healthcare (5% of total), 40% opposed the out-party. None of the
Republican Party’s 2015 healthcare-related tweets (2.47% of total) showed support for the outparty. In both 2012 and 2015, Republican healthcare-related tweets showed no support for their
own party, but instead, opposed the in-party 100% of the time.
While I report here that each hypothesis was supported, I recognize the severe limitations
of this very small dataset. More expansive investigation is warranted to make any fair and
accurate determinations.
Discussion
In general, we observe broad differences between administration of the Romney and
Obama accounts that support other academic study of the campaigns’ style and structure (Kreiss,
2014). This is evident in the mere mathematics of the posts: Romney’s account issued only
12.51% of the number of tweets that the Obama account did in the same time period. Obama’s
digital team was granted autonomy and the campaign’s digital director was viewed as an equal to
the communications director (Kreiss, 2014). In contrast, Romney’s tweets had to obtain approval
of more than a dozen staffers, all the way up the chain of command. Romney’s digital team
began to adapt press releases into tweets in order to have immediately available content (Kreiss,
2014). This made his tweets seem very institutional, whereas Obama’s tweets convey a more
effective, conversational tone (Kelleher, 2009). Further we see use of Barack and Michelle
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Obama’s initials as signatures on specific tweets to connect with their online community. These
tweets were an extension of the same messages already relayed via Twitter, but placed increased
importance on the message through a credible, personable sender (Park & Lee, 2013).
Why did we see so few tweets about healthcare, especially from the Republican National
Committee (RNC) and Romney? Perhaps this could be attributed to the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) and Obama’s frequent references in 2012 to “Romneycare,” the
Massachusetts-run healthcare system, which served as the blueprint for the PPACA. Romney and
his team may have decided to avoid discussion of healthcare because of this easy link. While the
RNC used “Obamacare” in all healthcare-related tweets in 2012 and 2015, the DNC and Obama
used the term more often, and took great strides to linguistically reappropriate the term and use it
favorably among supporters. This tactic is supported by Conover’s study (1981) that revealed
that in-party cues elicit positive attributions; Romney’s team may not have had success as
Conover (1981) found further that out-party cues don’t always elicit negative attributions. Had
the RNC nominated a different presidential candidate in 2012, they may have used the term
“Obamacare” more frequently.
It was interesting to find two RNC tweets that supported both the in- and out-parties. One
referenced support and opposition from different medical associations, with support coming from
the American Medical Association and opposition coming from many state medical associations.
The second referred to bipartisan cooperation to eliminate abortion-funding in the PPACA.
On the topic of abortion, another interesting finding was a high frequency in the
connection between healthcare reform, abortion or women’s issues, and the economy or taxes.
These were often mentioned together largely because the funding of these issues was supported
in some conditions but opposed under other conditions.
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Limitations
Despite many investigators’ reliance on Topsy, an online tweet archive, the software can
be challenging. I was not able to pull date and time analytics, which limited my ability to crosstabulate tactics with major national events and media coverage. This limited my ability to
quantify agenda-setting effects and potentially show that, while the parties and candidates were
not talking about healthcare reform much, the media was discussing it heavily. I was able to
determine the date content was published by limiting the search criteria to a single 48-hour
period and eliminating content that was posted the previous day; limiting search criteria to a 24hour period returns no content.
Further, data collection was difficult because many tweets on Obama’s account were
repeated. While it took a while to discover that Topsy was not providing the same tweets
repeatedly, I was able to determine through close attention to the linked content that Obama’s
camp just used the same language multiple times, but directed each tweet of repeated text to
unique urls. Perhaps Obama’s team was testing most effective dates and times to post, and I can
only imagine the amount of data they were able to collect if tracking those unique urls. This
technique could also be a use of the marketing tactic whereby verbatim messages are repeated a
number of times to ensure retention and conversion of an attitude. Further qualitative study of the
content candidates linked would be insightful to understand opposition of and support for in- and
out-party candidates and issues.
While I was able to show that my hypotheses were supported, further study to show the
same effects with a larger volume of content is needed. Other than the one outlier, the 2009
Republican Party tweets, which had 77%, or n=77, tweets about healthcare, no studied group (by
date and party or date and candidate) had more than 5% (n=5) tweets about healthcare. The
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largest number of tweets, other than the previously referenced batch of 77, was 17 tweets issued
by the Obama account (2.50% of total). In sum, only 93 party tweets and 17 candidate tweets of
1,571 total tweets were about healthcare. With a larger volume of content, additional analysis of
affectively loaded metaphors, such as “healthcare experiment”, “liberty”, and “Romnesia” would
be interesting.
Finally, future analysis needs to show inter-rater reliability with use of multiple coders
either coding the whole corpus or significant portions of it and calculating Krippendorph’s alpha.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 2: HOW DOES THE WHITE HOUSE
COMMUNICATE ABOUT POLICY PRIORITIES?
Jonathan Nickens, doctoral student in political science at LSU, was a
co-investigator on this study in its original form. He contributed to the literature review,
while I coded and analyzed the data. Nickens helped to collect and interpret sources and
to develop fundamental theoretical ideas for this study.
Edelman, Lakoff, and Lippmann remind us that what we know about the world is socially
constructed. Our experiences are often understood second-hand through the perspective of an
intermediary relaying information to us. The way we understand these experiences is not just a
matter of the original observer’s worldview and explanation of what they experienced, but how
we reinterpret this information through our construction of our own world from first-hand
experiences. “The world people experience as the wider setting for their everyday lives is a
chameleon world that transforms its contours with the changing cues that news accounts convey”
(Edelman, 1988, 29).
While we understand our world to be socially constructed—that we understand one
experience through other experiences—we can see the strong influence those who help create
these frames of understanding have on our worldview. Political elites have long used the media
as symbiotic partner in creating this consciousness. We understand from Sellers (2009) that the
elites set the agenda, the elites communicate that agenda to the media, the media communicate
that message to the public, and elites closely monitor media coverage for an interpretation of
public opinion. We understand that elites are both actors and an audience, that they “reinforce
rationalization for each other” (Edelman, 1988, 96). Greenberg (2016) shows this relationship
between elites and the media is nothing new; in fact, it has helped shape Americans’
understanding of the world for more than a century.
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Research Questions
The White House sets the media and public agendas based on what it chooses to
communicate via official channels and how often it communicates about each policy priority. By
giving the president’s dedicated time and attention (via speeches, online chats, appearances) and
his official communications’ primary thrust to a policy priority, the White House signals to the
public what is important. I will show that the White House is using agenda-setting theory to
elevate the healthcare reform policy to a priority position with the American public.
Obama bucked the traditional White House trend of issuing information primarily via
press release and press conference by establishing the first White House Twitter account in April
2009 to communicate directly to the public through social media. He hired a team to develop
self-generated content, and resurrected a digital transmission-based White House news service
(Greenberg, 2016, 443).
With ties to agenda-setting theory established, I will show that communication tactics
around the healthcare reform priority become critical to helping us understand how much the
executive branch is providing information for the public good and how much it is attempting to
persuade us to accept the administration’s point of view. Based on Lippmann's bleak outlook,
without priming, provision of information might be somewhat futile—people don’t have the time
or inclination to learn or understand the issues fully to form an opinion. Given Converse’s,
Lupia’s, and Zaller’s arguments, propaganda provides the cues people need to activate their
innate ideologies in order to help them form an attitude.
Motivated by this literature, I use two research questions to guide my search.
RQ1: How does the White house communicate about the president’s high priority
policies?
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RQ2: Does the White House deploy provision of information to the public, propaganda,
or does it use both styles?
Methods
To better understand how the White House communicates to the public about the
president’s high priority policies, I focus on communication through Twitter. To this end, in
February 2016, I accessed all 17,590 @WhiteHouse tweets issued from January 1, 2012 through
December 31, 2015 using a firehose dearchive method in Crimson Hexagon.1 This time period
reveals how the White House team’s tactics evolved during both a reelection and an incumbency,
during the launch of new legislation, and through legal and logistical challenges with the law.
While Crimson Hexagon initially constrained search returns, which would have eliminated
access to tweets prior to 2013, I developed a workaround that allowed me access to all data in the
selected timeframe.2
This timeframe allowed me to capture White House social media communication over the
course of five salient events related to the PPACA. I wished to capture preemptive
communication and response to each of these events. First, the National Federation of
Independent Business sued then-Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius. Their suit challenged the legality of the individual mandate that required all Americans
to secure health insurance by 2014 or face a financial penalty. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld

1 Crimson

Hexagon is a subscription-based, real-time social media monitoring system that helps institutions glean
meaning from vast amounts of social data published by any user. Crimson Hexagon provides access to the Twitter
Firehose, which allowed us to receive 100% of all tweets issued without limiting our returns to a particular number
of search results. Unlike streaming and search APIs, which are data pushes, the firehose method is a data pull, and
though costly, frees users from Twitter-imposed usage restrictions tied to Twitter infrastructure limitations.
(http://brnrd.me/twitter-apis-vs-twitter-firehose/)
2
I initially mined the data using a Crimson Hexagon “social monitor,” but soon found that this would only return
tweets back to 2013. This did not capture the full amount of time I wished to access. By using a Crimson Hexagon
“buzz monitor,” I was able to pull all tweets as far back as the account’s creation in 2009. This limited some
analytics, but for future studies, these can be logged manually using the permalinks provided in the downloaded data
set.
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the individual mandate on June 28, 2012, siding with the Obama administration’s policy (Barnes,
2012; Redhead, 2013; SCOTUS Blog, 2012). Second, the Budget Control Act of 2011 should
have gone into effect January 1, 2013, as an austerity measure designed to cap government
spending3 (Booth, 2013; Matthews, 2013). Third, the first open enrollment period for the
PPACA opened on October 1, 2013, and the Heathcare.gov site failed to accommodate the
volume of traffic it received (Alonso-Zaldivar, 2013; Payne et al., 2013; Rudansky, 2013). The
website became fodder for GOP criticism that the PPACA was not working. Fourth, formerDepartment of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius sued Hobby Lobby
Corporation, a for-profit, non-religious organization, over their failure to include contraception
coverage to employees4 (SCOTUS Blog, 2014). Finally, David King sued Department of Health
and Human Services Secretary Sylvia Burwell, claiming its provision of subsidies to individuals
in states without state-operated exchanges violated the PPACA. On June 25, 2015, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided that all qualifying persons in all states should be eligible for subsidies,
both those with state-operated exchanges and those using exchanges established by the
Department of Health and Human Services directly (Sanger-Katz, 2015).
Before I could begin analysis, I narrowed the full universe of @WhiteHouse tweets
issued during this timeframe to content specific to healthcare reform and the Affordable Care
Act. I only considered what is visible in the tweet and video content that automatically begins to
play. I did not consider content that required additional engagement, primarily clicking. I

3

The cuts were delayed by two months because of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012. These austerity
measures included Republican provisions to cut spending, including some provisions of the PPACA.
4
Before this legislation reached the Supreme Court, Sebelius resigned and Congress approved appointment of
current Secretary Sylvia Burwell. As originally enacted, the PPACA fines for-profit employers $100 per day per
patient for refusing coverage. On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court sided with Hobby Lobby Corporation,
noting that closely held for-profit corporations could claim religious exception to the law and avoid the penalty. The
White House put in place government-sponsored alternatives for female employees of these closely-held, for-profit
organizations to access contraception (SCOTUS Blog, 2014).
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excluded tweets that did not load, that are not in English, and that feature broken links (because
we are not able to determine whether or not they met the criteria for inclusion). I visit each tweet
via its permalink to view it in Twitter itself. This allowed me to glean the context of information
in embedded graphics and links. I did not code anything based on just the text that exported into
Excel from Crimson Hexagon. I concluded this parsing with a sample of 1,613 tweets.
To complete an inductive textual analysis of the sample, I first employed emergent opencoding to a randomly selected 10% subsample (n=161). I coded for tactical applications in order
to identify and describe how the White House communicated. These tactics emerged into initial
codes that begin to repeat as I worked through the subsample. I was able to prepare a preliminary
qualitative code book (see Appendix C) identifying codes used with enough frequency not to be
isolated occurrences, as well as the observable tactical applications characterizing each code. To
complete the open coding, I coded the remaining 90% of tweets in the sample using the
preliminary code book. I observed validation for existing codes, but given the large remainder of
the sample, new codes emerged. These new codes revealed tactical applications that I had not
originally observed and tactical applications that justified splitting some codes into multiple subcodes based on frequency of observation.
To verify my coding, I asked a doctoral student to code a randomly selected 10% of the
sample using my codebook (see Appendix F). Unlike my coding that accounted for every code
applicable to each tweet, he selected a single code for each tweet. To reconcile this, I identified
whether his single code matched any of my codes. His coding was congruent with mine 76% of
the time. This is considered an acceptable reliability measure for exploratory research (Wimmer
and Dominick, 2014).
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Analysis
To explore RQ2, I developed a definition of propaganda with which to characterize each
tactical application applied in each tweet. This helped me to parse two types of tweets: those
providing information for the public good, and those characterized by propaganda.
I slightly modifed a definition of propaganda put forth by Garth Jowett and Victoria
O’Donnell (2014)5 to determine whether each category met the criteria of propaganda. They
defined propaganda as follows: "Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the
desired intent of the propagandist" (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014, 7). To this definition I added “to
stimulate emotions,” to reflect the work of Ellul, who wrote that propaganda was "psychological
manipulation" (Ellul, 1965; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014, 4); Doob, who defined propaganda as
"the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior…" (Doob, 1948, 390; Jowett
& O’Donnell, 2014); Pratkanis and Aronson, who defined propaganda as "mass suggestion" of
the "psychology of the individual" (Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001, 11; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014);
Bogart, who explained that the propagandist has to have "insight into how the audience thinks
and reacts" (Bogart, 1995, 195-196; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014); and Pratkanis and Turner, who
indicate that propaganda "plays on prejudices and emotions" (Pratkanis & Turner, 1996, 190;
Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014). Thus, my final definition, by which I judged whether each emergent
category was to be parsed as public information or propaganda, was: Propaganda is the
deliberate, systematic attempt to stimulate emotions, shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions,
and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.

5

Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition of propaganda was based on their extensive work and the contributions of
others who attempted to define propaganda over decades. Their definition reflects the scholarly writings of Doob
(1948), Qualter (1962), Ellul (1965), Sproule (1994), Bogart (1995), Pratkanis and Turner (1996), Carey (1997),
Taithe and Thornton (2000), Pratkanis and Aronson (2001), Parry-Giles (2002), and O'Shaughnessy (2004).
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Within the two major types of tweets—public information and propaganda—I
found thirteen broad categories to emerge through qualitative coding: announcements about open
enrollment, discussion of provisions, goal setting/goal clarification, transparency with ordinary
citizens, asking others to share information related to open enrollment, using sourced facts, using
unsourced facts, using facts sourced back to the White House or administration, third-party
validation, relating to average citizens, dominant language, reasons to get covered, and calls to
action (see Figure 1). I was able to characterize each of these as provision of information or
propaganda based on the criteria contained in the definition of propaganda. Within many of the
thirteen categories I could also parse subcategories, each defined by repeated observation of the
same White House communication tactics.
It is noteworthy that some tweets could be assigned to both the public information and
propaganda categories, and often merited classification into multiple broad categories
characterized by tactical applications. I first turned my attention to those characterized as public
information because their intent and tactical application did not meet my modified version of
Jowett and O’Dowell’s definition of propaganda.
Categories of Provision of Public Information
I identified six of the thirteen categories as providing fact-based information for the
public good (see Table 1). In these cases, information is shared in a way that is not intended to
persuade or advance the acceptance or popularity of the legislation. These categories are based in
sourced facts that a citizen can track back to a nonpartisan or bipartisan agency versus provision
of information that cannot be independently authenticated.
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Figure 1. Diagram of All Categories
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media

elected
officials

Table 1. Category Structure in Provision of Public Information
Category
Subcategory 1
using unsourced facts
--using facts sourced to the
--White House
calls to action
citizens
officials
reasons to get covered
fear/anxiety appeals
peace of mind
dominant language

relating to average citizens
third-party validation

leading intros
American idealism
sarcasm
opining
opposing out-party
success claiming
stereotypes
forced news values
citizens
celebrities
media
elected officials

Subcategory 2
----------for you
for your mother
----------------numbers of calls, web visits,
applications
testimonials
-------

Discussion of Provisions
The White House used Twitter to provide detail about the Affordable Care Act’s terms
and conditions, such as co-pays, preventive care, and contraception, as well as intended
consequences the law would have on other government functions, such as reduction to the
deficit. This category only communicates terms of the law, and very easily fits into the broad
category of provision of information. This was the most frequently occurring tweet category in
the broader category of provision of information. I coded nonpartisan agencies’ expected success
as provision of information, but coded tweets that included success-claiming language like,
“thanks to the ACA,” as propaganda. The subcategories here represented information for the
public good.
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Plan Provisions
The first set of subcategories I observed is how frequently the White House took to
Twitter to provide detail and clarification on the medical provisions of the PPACA, such as
lifetime limits, coverage despite preexisting conditions, preventive care, and contraception (see
Figure 2). I established a subcategory for discussion of medical provisions based on the
frequency of posts about medical coverage. Similarly, I saw a significant number of posts
discussing who was eligible for coverage, including the popular provision that young adults may
stay on their parents’ plans until age 26. These posts, which did not include mention of medical
allowances, were observed with enough frequency to merit a separate subcategory for coverage
provisions.

Figure 2: Exemplar Tweet—Plan Provisions
Economic Benefits
A second set of subcategories included tweets about PPACA-derived personal and
government economic benefits, like lower co-pays and a reduction in the national deficit. I saw
two types of economic benefits, and thus established two subcategories: personal and
government. Personal economic benefit included tweets discussing improvements to personal
and family finances, including premiums and out-of-pocket costs, reduced cost or free
prescription coverage, and free preventative care and screenings (see Figure 3). Government
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economic benefit included tweets discussing PPACA-caused decreases in the accrual rate of
national debt and decreases in the national deficit predicted by the bipartisan Congressional
Budget Office (see Figure 4). Some tweets addressed the historic lows in healthcare cost growth
as a result of PPACA regulations. I attempted to classify tweets that provided cited sources for
their claims under the subcategories of provision of information. Readers will note, however, that
this tactic is often also coded as propaganda for all the instances where the White House did not
source their claims.

Figure 3: Exemplar Tweet—Personal Economic Benefit
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Figure 4: Exemplar Tweet—Government Economic Benefit
Improved Service Delivery
A third subcategory emerged with tweets about improvements to service delivery that
Americans gained as a result of the PPACA. These included discussions of how much of an
individual’s premium dollar would go to patient care, improvements in hospital care, expansion
of community and school clinics that allowed for new medical hires, and new safety measures
(see Figure 5). Some tweets discussed PPACA-imposed outcomes tied to funding that improved
patient care.

Figure 5: Exemplar Tweet—Improved Service Delivery
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Announcements about Open Enrollment
The White House also spent a good deal of time discussing annual open enrollment, the
next category I grouped into provision of information. In discussing open enrollment the White
House announced deadlines to enroll (see Figure 6), how to enroll, shared the amount of time

Figure 6: Exemplar Tweet—Announcements about Open Enrollment

remaining before open enrollment closes, and announced via cited third-party sources how many
people are covered. Readers will note that we also cited this tactic in the propaganda category for
all the instances where the White House did not source the number of people who enrolled.
Goal Setting/Goal Clarification
A third category included tweets that clarify Senator Nancy Pelosi6 and President Barack
Obama’s objectives of the PPACA and set goals for the law’s success. These tweets
communicate information like who would be covered, how many would be covered, and how
accessible coverage would become. They often included language refuting false claims by the
out-party or the media. Opening statements like “I signed the ACA for,” “the goal we’ve set for
ourselves is,” and “this is about” characterize this category (see Figure 7). One interesting
6

Sen. Pelosi authored and introduced the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in Congress.
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finding is that goal clarification tweets often also included strong emotional appeals, which we
will later characterize as propaganda. Perhaps the most frequently used statement of this category
in both tweets and other forums, like speeches, is that Obama signed the PPACA because “no
one should go broke just because they get sick” (“Remarks by the President,” 2012).

Figure 7: Exemplar Tweet—Goal Setting/Goal Clarification

Transparency with Ordinary Citizens
Throughout all the consumer questions, legal action, and website glitches the executive
branch encountered in the rollout of this legislation, the White House accepted responsibility for
failings and offered many opportunities to be transparent with ordinary citizens; this is my fourth
subcategory. Obama and Sebelius frequently made themselves available to take public questions
submitted via Twitter to be answered via Twitter (see Figure 8). Many of the White House’s
tweets shared times and dates the president would be making statements about or taking media
questions related to the PPACA. The White House often live-streamed these presidential
appearances on a linked whitehouse.gov media center page and snippets were frequently
provided as embedded YouTube videos in the tweets themselves. The White House also issued
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tweets discussing the website and improvements the executive branch was making to ensure
reliability.

Figure 8: Exemplar Tweets—Transparency with Citizens
Asking Others to Share Information Related to Enrollment
The White House issued ample calls to action via tweets encouraging people to enroll and
encouraging people to remind others about open enrollment (see Figure 9). These calls to action
drove behavior necessary to avoid PPACA penalties for lack of health insurance coverage. For
this reason, I grouped this subcategory into the category of provision of information. I also show
a category of calls to action that fits more into the category of propaganda because it asks people
to share information about the legislation with the goal of advancing favorable public opinion.
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Figure 9: Exemplar Tweet—Asking Others to Share Information Related to Enrollment
Use of Sourced Facts
Finally, I coded a number of tweets that use facts, but I separate the use of facts into those
that provide a source (see Figure 10), from which the public can obtain the original data, and
those that do not provide a source, or that source back to the executive branch. I classified
sourced facts as provision of information and unsourced facts, or those whose source was the
White House or administration, as propaganda. Unsourced facts could have been framed in favor
of the PPACA when presented to the public. The White House did not source facts very often,
and when they did, the source was often a government agency.
Thus, the provision of information category contains six subcategories: discussion of plan
provisions; announcements about open enrollment; goal setting or goal clarification;
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transparency in availability to answer questions, accept responsibility for flaws, and discuss the
legislation; calls to action to avoid penalties; and use of sourced facts.

Figure 10: Exemplar Tweets—Sourced Facts
Categories of Propaganda
The remaining seven of the thirteen categories I categorized as propaganda (see Table 2).
Returning to Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition, these messages were both “deliberate and
systematic,” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2015, 7-8) in many cases following best practice in strategic
communications. They showed intentionality and planning in the coordinated sharing of
information and use of common facts, hashtags, success stories, and officials’ quotes.
Information was not simply shared, but carried a call to action, was framed from the
administration’s point of view, and/or claimed success. They sometimes extended that success to
the administration in general. These tweets opposed GOP viewpoints. They are designed to
advance the acceptance or popularity of the legislation. These categories are based in unsourced
facts that cannot be independently validated, may be framed in a way that flatters the
administration or legislation, or may be presented so as to exclusively support an
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administration’s perspective. These tweets implied a desire for behavior change resultant from
manipulated thoughts, perceptions, or emotions.
Table 2. Category Structure in Propaganda
Category
Subcategory 1
announcements re open
--enrollment
discussion of provision
plan provisions

improved service delivery
--website fixes and call centers
speeches
Q&As
ease of use
appeal to mothers

medical provisions
coverage provisions
for individuals
for government
---------------

---

---

economic benefits
goal setting/goal clarification
transparency with ordinary
citizens

asking others to share info re
enrollment
using sourced facts

Subcategory 2
---

Use of Unsourced Facts, Facts Sourced to Administration
The Obama White House used tweets to persuade, and potentially manipulate, when they
used ample data without attribution or with implied administration sources that remain unnamed
(see Figure 11). This did not allow for government accountability whereby a citizen could
research original, nonpartisan facts; find supporting and refuting evidence; and draw his own
conclusion. This made up the first set of subcatgories I classified as propaganda: unsourced facts
and facts sourced back to the administration.
Calls to Action
The administration also used extensive calls to action asking citizens and elected officials
to help advance the PPACA with their families, friends, and constituencies. This is the second
subcategory, which has three subcategories of its own.
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Figure 11: Exemplar Tweets—Unsourced Facts
Directed to Citizens
Some calls to action targeted individual citizens, encouraging them to share good news
about the PPACA and to tell others about legislative successes (see Figure 12). This category’s

Figure 12: Exemplar Tweet—Calls to Action Directed to Citizens
tweets discussed expected savings for the U.S. government and for American families and called
citizens to support the legislation for these expected outcomes. In these ways the White House
used calls to action not to encourage people to enroll to avoid penalty, but instead to encourage
them to advance the law with the power of word of mouth and personal, favorable testimonial.
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Directed to Elected Officials
The second subcategory within the “Calls to Action” category is messaging directed to
other elected officials (see Figure 13). Particularly around the time of the 2013 sequester, the
administration called legislators to pass a budget that continued to fund the PPACA. As the
situation drew on, the White House called legislators to prevent the sequester, then to end it, and
to stop attempts to repeal the law. In many cases, the White House called state elected officials to
expand Medicare for their citizens under the PPACA.

Figure 13: Exemplar Tweet—Calls to Action Directed to Officials
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Directed to the Media
One subcategory that did not emerge in the data is a call to action to the media. While
extensive literature shows that elected officials use the media to shape public opinion via agendasetting in what they do and do not cover, I was not able to definitively identify examples of the
White House calling the media to inform the public.
I placed these subcategories within a broader persuasive call to action category and
within the propaganda category. I did this, in lieu of collapsing the two call to action categories
and including one category into the other (public information or propaganda) because these calls
to action drew on different motives. The call to action category I placed within provision of
information called people to enroll so they may avoid penalty for lack of healthcare coverage.
The call to action category I placed within propaganda called people to spread positive outlooks
on the legislation to advance favorable public opinion of the law.
Emotional Reasons to Get Covered
While there were implied reasons to get covered in the medical and plan provisions I
grouped into the provision of information category, the White House also used strong, emotional
reasons to get covered that appealed to a desire to avoid anxiety. This was congruent with the
modified Jowett and O’Donnell definition that addresses psychological manipulation and
stimulated emotions, and made up the third subcategory, which has a pair of subcategories itself.
Fear and Anxiety Appeals
Perhaps the most familiar of all the sentiments President Obama shared about the PPACA
are versions of “people shouldn’t go broke just because they get sick” (“Remarks by the
President,” 2012). The White House elicited anxiety by discussing the actual costs of common
conditions, physician visits, and hospitalization without health coverage. They directly stated or
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implied the potential financial ruin that may come as a result of an unexpected medical condition
if you are without health insurance (see Figure 14). Finally, they simply reminded people of the
unknown—you never know when you might face an accident, injury, or illness. Arguably, the
White House tapped into one of the best means of changing attitudes and behavior: appealing to
emotion, particularly anxiety. In fact, much emerging neuropsychology work shows that emotion
and reason are intertwined (Brader, 2008; Lakoff, 2008; Westen 2007).

Figure 14: Exemplar Tweet—Fear/Anxiety Appeals
Peace of Mind
The other dominant emotional reason to get covered encompassed a second set of
subcategories: appeals to peace of mind for yourself and for your mother. Perhaps the best
converse of fear and anxiety appeals was appeals to be free of anxiety and fear. The White House
encouraged people to obtain coverage under the PPACA in order to obtain peace of mind (see
Figure 15). They extended this appeal to relationships between children and their mothers
whereby they encouraged young people to obtain coverage so their mothers would have peace of
mind (see Figure 16).
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Figure 15: Exemplar Tweet—Peace of Mind

Figure 16: Exemplar Tweet—Peace of Mind for Moms
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Relating to the Average Citizen
A fourth category that emerged was relating to the average citizen. In this category, I
observed tactics like referencing the family budget and the paycheck-to-paycheck struggle a lack
of affordable healthcare can cause. The White House used testimonials of the Obama family,
sharing tales of how the middle-class Obamas struggled in a single-parent-led family. Finally,
the White House appealed to ordinary people by using holidays to create news values, spinning
the PPACA topic into relevance throughout the calendar year when it would otherwise not be
timely, have currency, or have human interest (see Figure 17). The administration also provided
an incentive for people to get coverage with contests in order to have the president visit their
city.

Figure 17: Exemplar Tweets—Average Citizens
Appeals through Stereotypes
A subcategory of the “Average Citizen” category emerges via the frequency in the White
House’s appeal to stereotypes. This is another token tactic using documented success in
converting behavior by appealing to group cues (Brader, 2008). This subcategory is
characterized by stereotypes of mothers as nervous and worried and by stereotypes of children
who are procrastinators and who are not paying attention to the PPACA options or deadlines (see
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Figure 18). Interestingly, fathers are not targeted in either appeals to anxiety, news values, or
appeals to stereotypes. The executive branch uses mothers as both the subject of their appeal,
e.g., “Do you want your mother to have a nervous breakdown?” (White House, 2014a, March
14) and the activators of youth behavior change, e.g., “We nag you because we love you, so go
to…and enroll today” (White House, 2014b, March 14).

Figure 18: Exemplar Tweets—Stereotype Appeals
Third-party Validation
The White House also employed third-party validation to engender agreement with its
legislation, which comprises my fifth category. In some cases, the executive branch showed
collaboration with outside groups that support the legislation. In other cases, they provided
testimonials of ordinary Americans who have benefitted from the legislation, and hence, support
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the administration’s initiative. Sometimes chided for close ties to Hollywood, the administration
frequently used tweets to share celebrity endorsements of the PPACA by retweeting their
messages related to the legislation, open enrollment, and the impact on ordinary people they
know. In this way, the administration appealed to the ordinary man who may have naively seen
the endorsement of a celebrity as a reason to support the measure. Finally, the White House
retweeted media coverage to vouch for success of the law. Ironically, however, this coverage
was often a result of heavy relationship cultivation with media. The White House often presented
this media coverage as evidence of favorable public opinion. These persuasive uses of third-party
validation by elected officials, citizens, celebrities, and the media made up subcategories of this
fifth category.
The use of citizen validation was shown in two different ways. In some cases, they shared
first-person testimonials of citizens’ favorability to the PPACA (see Figure 19). In others, they
indirectly showed validation by indicating high numbers of citizens who had called, visited the
Healthcare.gov website, and applied for coverage (see Figure 20).

Figure 19: Exemplar Tweets—Citizen Testimonial
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Figure 20: Exemplar Tweet—Citizen Use of PPACA
Dominant Language
A final category I included in the propaganda super category was dominant language,
which I parsed into a number of subcategories.
Dramatic Adjectives
The administration used dramatic adjectives to exaggerate the perceived impact of the
law and the impact of those who opposed it. Opponents and their propositions were labeled as
“reckless” (White House, 2013 September 23) and “undermining” (White House, 2013
September 17) (see Figure 21). The potential outcomes of a repeal of the PPACA were described
as “catastrophic” (White House, 2014 February 14). The White House also used affectivelyloaded cues that drew on the fear and anxieties of the American people. They wrote of “losing
everything” (White House, 2014 February 24) that discouraged opposition of the law and
encouraged people to support it in order to avoid these outcomes.
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Figure 21: Exemplar Tweet—Dramatic Adjectives
Success Claiming
The executive branch frequently used versions of “thanks to the ACA” or “thanks to
Obamacare,” to open tweets that claim success (see Figure 22). These could have been mere
statements of fact, but were instead affectively loaded with a leading introduction to persuade.
Sometimes they used possessive pronouns to claim ownership of success or favorability. In many
instances, the White House claimed success for the law with certitude; the opposition would
counter-argue its success to be debatable. Two words, “affordable” and “quality” are often used
71

Figure 22: Exemplar Tweet—Claiming Success
to describe the PPACA, but these took on much different meanings for the two parties at odds
over this legislation. For this reason, I scrutinized adjectives, but I did not code the often-used
“affordable” as dominant merely because it is used in the name of the legislation. One
could argue, however, that the affectively cued naming of this legislation could be seen as a
propagandistic strategy.
Opposing the Out Party
The White House also used particular language to dominate the conversation and
overtake the out-party’s criticism. Not only did they boast of in-party dominance, like “ACA is
here to stay” (White House, 2015, June 25), but they also opposed the out-party. The White
House used hashtags like #PeopleOverPolitics (White House, 2015, February 23) when
addressing the GOP on issues like failure to pass a budget that funded the PPACA and failure by
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some state leaders to expand Medicare under the law (see Figure 23). The opposition went
deeper when the White House began to levy allegations that the GOP might not have the
country’s best interest at heart or that they are ignoring the public’s normative desire for
accessible and affordable healthcare. More often than not, these tweets had a negative tone.

Figure 23: Exemplar Tweet—Attacking the Out Party
Opining and Overgeneralization
A similar subcategory to opposing the out-party was opining through overgeneralizations
and jumping to conclusions (see Figure 24). The White House submitted opinions about what
may happen in the future; for example, they often conjectured about what might happen if the
PPACA was repealed. In some circumstances they opined about the reasons and causes behind
events taking place presently. In broad terms, these opinions cannot be proven, but always
support the PPACA.
Sarcasm
The White House also employed sarcasm and inside jokes as a means of dominating the
conversation (see Figure 25). This tactic was often observed in hashtags. They sometimes asked
comedians who supported the legislation to appear in White House-produced YouTube videos.
They then tweeted inside jokes that could only be understood after watching the video.
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Figure 24: Exemplar Tweet—Opining or Overgeneralization

Figure 25: Exemplar Tweet—Sarcasm
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Occasionally they referenced jokes made by comedians independent of the White House.
Comedians and celebrities who became frustrated with frequent criticism of the Obama White
House begin to say “thanks, Obama” for a number of absurdities that had no connection to
Obama (White House, 2015 February 12). Thus, the White House took up the trend and began to
sarcastically tweet #ThanksObama after communicating successes of the PPACA. Sometimes
the executive branch tweeted sarcastic support in line with messaging of the out-party. For
example, when the GOP discussed a budget that defunded the PPACA, the White House tweeted
#DefundObamacare (White House, 2013, September 24) messages to introduce worst-case
scenarios, to threaten the loss of popular plan provisions, and to oppose the out-party.
American Idealism
The White House also discussed a vision of America from the point of view of the
Obama administration that the PPACA supports. The executive branch identified their perceived
American values, one of which was to care for others by providing accessible healthcare for all
(see Figure 26). In this way, they posited that healthcare is an American right, not a privilege.
Similarly, the White House argued that American women should have the right to make their
own healthcare decisions and affirmed their reproductive rights.

Figure 26: Exemplar Tweet—American Idealism
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Leading Introductions
The White House used strategic language to dominate the conversation by announcing
“breaking” at the beginning of some tweets and starting others with “FACT,” always in all
capital letters (see Figure 27). They often followed these declarations with fact-like statements
that may or may not have been sourced to bipartisan agencies.

Figure 27: Exemplar Tweet—Leading Introductions
The propaganda category contains seven subcategories: use of unsourced facts; use of
facts sourced back to the executive branch; calls to action to advance favorable public opinion;
reasons to get covered; relating to the average citizen; third-party validation; and dominant
language.
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Discussion
Examining a specific case of executive communication, the White House’s use of Twitter
to communicate about Obamacare, I was developed a working network of strategies applied to
the communications challenge. I conducted a directed, inductive qualitative content analysis on a
sample of White House tweets regarding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act from
January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2015. Distinguishing characteristics between information
for good and information for persuasion emerged. Two super categories, provision of
information and propaganda, subsumed several unique tactical categories defined by intention
and organization of communications, whether they were intended to change attitudes, whether it
intended to change behavior, and whether these changes would be to the White House’s
advantage. A discussion of PPACA provisions, announcements about open enrollment,
intentions to engage ordinary citizens, calls to action directed to citizens, and provision of
sourced facts characterized tweets intended to provide information. Of these, discussion of plan
provisions and open enrollment occurred early in the timeframe and most frequently, suggesting
that the White House used social media to fill what they perceived to be information gaps about
the PPACA. Interestingly, the sourced facts category was characterized by sharing of
information, but information was rarely attributed to sources outside the White House. For
example, in Twitter communication relevant administration officials and the president himself
were often made available to discuss pertinent aspects of the PPACA, but their facts from outside
sources were rarely communicated directly. This may have been a limitation of medium. Often
there may not have been enough characters for attribution. Regardless, lack of attribution is
normatively undesirable from the perspective of democratic theory.
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The second super category, propaganda, defined most tweets in the sample. My coding
scheme allowed me to identify several categories of tactics, looking to intended outcome and
type of appeals, that define propaganda tweets including: relating to average citizen, third-party
validation, calls to action, emotional appeals, and use of dominant language. Of these, tweets
characterized by dominant language occurred most frequently. The White House used partisan
and emboldened language to intimate certitude and correctness, likely as a means of
counteracting negative coverage of the PPACA. Perhaps not surprisingly, this type of tweet
occurred more frequently at the end of the studied timeframe, suggesting that once the policy
was implemented and the favorable Supreme Court decision was handed down, the
administration became more confident in their communications about the policy. Strategically,
use of such language is probably effective; followers that agree with the president feel
reinvigorated in their support for Obamacare, and followers that disagree with the president
confirm that the administration is appealing to baser, affective messaging to accomplish their illadvised goals. Certainly the administration sees Republicans as a lost cause, so confirming the
existing attitudes of Democrats is likely a net gain. This pattern of tactical communication also
supports Study 1 that found that the Obama team used Twitter communications to linguistically
reappropriate the term “Obamacare” and portray it favorably. When an institution is constrained
to 140 characters to communicate their policy priorities, strong language is invaluable.
Within the tactical categories that define propaganda there are several subcategories of
note. First, when third-party validation is used—which attempts to lend credibility to information
by associating it with an outsider—the most common parties are other citizens, celebrities, and
the media. The use of media here is particularly interesting, as other studies show that members
of Congress use social media to set the news media’s agenda (Cook, 1998, 2006; Sellers, 2009)
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and that through a process of cultivation, elected officials develop symbiotic working
relationships with reporters and outlets (Greenberg, 2016; Sellers, 2009). Our results, however,
show that—in what amounts to a feedback loop—the White House is using the same media they
have cultivated relationships with in their Twitter communications as a means of implying public
consent for their policies. Scholarly work suggests that the public is influenced by what they
perceive to be the news media’s agenda (Pingree & Stoycheff, 2013), so by sharing the media’s
sentiments in their Twitter communications, the White House builds credibility. What makes this
use of the media to generate favorable pseudo-public opinion even more interesting is that the
White House only used a public opinion poll related to healthcare reform seven times during the
four-year timeframe of our study. This is likely because public opinion was generally not
favorable to the PPACA during the initial roll-out and thus, bringing attention to polls was
unlikely to support their objectives. Certainly we cannot extrapolate that the administration does
not care about public opinion given that each of the seven categories of tactics that define
propaganda are motivated by a need to curry public favor (or at least the appearance of favor).
We can suggest, however, that the administration may insinuate favorable public opinion even
when the numbers are not favorable towards the president’s goals (Herbst, 1998; Lewis, 2001).
The second subcategory of interest under the tactical categories ascribed to propaganda is
audience. Specifically, we find three primary audiences when the White House issues calls to
action: citizens, elected officials, and the media. Perhaps not surprisingly, the White House did
not intend Twitter communication about Obamacare to be for the eyes of the citizenry only, but
they also targeted elites and media. When the White House uses Twitter to talk about healthcare,
it may be signaling to political elites that this is a high priority to the president, that members of
the party should get in line, and that reporters should cover this issue. Work on presidential
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campaigns’ use of Twitter suggests as much: Twitter is useful for defining journalists‘
conversations and the language of media elites about an issue early-on and, aspirationally, in a
way that favors your candidate (Kreiss, 2014). If the same is true for candidates once in office,
then we should fully expect the White House uses Twitter similarly—to define the terms of the
debate, here around Obamacare.
These results shed light on the differences in executive Twitter communications that
intend to inform and Twitter communications that intend to persuade. I can pinpoint the tactics
used in Twitter communication to parse out the type of executive communication employed. I
am limited by the timeframe, which misses a substantial number of recent tweets and my method
of inductive qualitative coding which makes it difficult to standardize my approach to other cases
and subject matters. I am also limited to our medium, Twitter, and my case study topic, White
House communication about Obamacare. It is possible that other cases would likely yield
different patterns. Still, it is my hope that by taking this deep-dive into the content that I can lend
some nuance to our understanding of the provision of information in a decidedly 21st-century
case.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
There is broad understanding that most people do not spend time learning and
understanding the issues, but instead rely on others to help inform their perspective (Lippmann,
1922). We allow media and elites to help us draw conclusions based on their knowledge of the
issues and experiences we may not have (Lippmann, 1922). For example, we may not be able to
experience what is happening in Syria, so we rely on journalists to help inform us. We may not
understand complex economic or foreign policy, so we count on elites who have the expert
knowledge of these issues.
This thesis investigated how elites provide the public information related to policy
priorities, and how they strategically use language to impact our perspective and opinions about
those policies. I considered how the candidates and parties discussed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in the lead up to the bill’s passage in 2009; during the presidential
election in 2012; during President Obama’s second term, which included the rollout of the law;
and at the beginning of the 2016 presidential election during primary season. I considered how
the public learned about this law from either side of the aisle, how language was used to
influence citizens from both political perspectives, and how emotion became a critical part of the
communication formula.
Generally, we see broad support for agenda-setting theory, whereby the GOP and the
White House directed the conversation about healthcare reform to reflect their respective
perspectives on the issue. The GOP rallied their base arguing that the PPACA was an overreach
of executive power into individual lives and used President Obama, who was unfavorable to
party members, as their antagonist. In building momentum for the term “Obamacare,” they drove
the agenda, telling people “what to think about”—individual costs, the deficit, death panels,
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abortion, and governmental breach of personal decision-making (“The Media’s Year,” 2013).
Arguably, applying Converse, Zaller, and Lupia’s work with constraints, predispositions, and
priming, we can show that the GOP’s “Obamacare” was used as a loaded moniker helping
people not just toward “what to think about” but also “what to think.” This cue was an emotional
rallying cry, pitting Obama, who was seen as a proponent of big government, against Americans
who appreciated their individual freedoms. The GOP identified this issue in a way that made
healthcare reform less about a social justice issue than it was about a breach of individual liberty
and an extension of the government. People may not have known much about the policy, but
they knew they didn’t like these qualities about Obama, so this cue linked the issues and helped
the public develop a quick opinion about the policy as well.
Brilliantly, the Democrats seized on the opportunity to linguistically reappropriate the
term in 2012 when the GOP nominated Mitt Romney as their candidate for president. Romney
had enacted a healthcare reform law in Massachusetts that quickly became known as
Romneycare. With this link, the GOP knew use of the “Obamacare” term would be risky—the
negative opinion about the PPACA may transfer and be similarly applied to their candidate.
Romney never touched the label in his presidential run. In the meantime, the Democrats swooped
in and began to use it to rally their base, with whom Obama had resounding support. For these
people, healthcare reform meant access, affordability, equal care, and social justice—protecting
the weakest from greedy corporations. The Democrats tied the moniker to the things their base
thought most important and began to talk about how “Obama cares.” This reappropriation of the
term continued after the 2012 election. The Democrats used it particularly often in 2013, the first
year of Obama’s second-term and the year they launched the PPACA. The second spike came
after public opinion improved and the Supreme Court upheld the law in 2015.
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We see patterns in the White House’s use of “Obamacare.” It is frequently used in
positive messaging that is intended to persuade agreeable parties. It is often paired with
propagandistic tactics designed to change attitudes and behavior. Finally, it is sometimes used in
aggressive ways as the White House mocks the out-party using their own term in opposing them:
“Defund Obamacare if…” and “Thanks, Obamacare.”
In fact, the frame “Obamacare” supports many of the five factors of framing: social
norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups,
journalists’ routines, and ideological or political orientation of journalists (Scheufele, 2000, 307).
Its first known use was by Andy Martin, a self-proclaimed investigative journalist and would-be
GOP politician (Reeve, 2011). He used the term to warn about the prospect of an Obama
presidency. In his case, “Obamacare” appealed to the social values of his blog readership as well
as his personal ideological framework. Sometime just afterward, Jeanne Schuete Scott, a lobbyist
working for the healthcare industry, used the term. Scott predicted the popularity healthcare
reform would have in the 2008 election and used a number of terms specific to a variety of
candidates and prospective candidates’ names before “care,” e.g., “Hillary-care,” “Obama-care,”
“Guiliani-care,” “McCain-care” (Reeve, 2011). For her, “Obamacare” and the others signaled the
massive shift she predicted in the industry for which she worked and published. It elucidated the
pressures her field would undergo should a reform bill pass. Finally, Mitt Romney was the first
mainstream politician to use the term on May 30, 2007 (Reeve, 2011). For him it was a reflection
on both the values of his demographic, his personal ideology, and the expectations of the
healthcare industry in seeking support for their Capitalist aims. For each of these first users, who
we are unsure were aware of one another, the cue “Obamacare” was a convenient shortcut to tap
into their audience’s belief systems and to influence the audience’s political judgments.
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As citizens, we can know that the government—including our candidates and elected
officials—not only provides us information, but also helps us tap into our ideologies to make
judgments about policy priorities. These political decisions are likely to be the same as decisions
we might otherwise make given the time and resources to fully understand the issue and its
implications. While we can be aware that the government is helping to set the agenda—to orient
“what we think about”—by prevalence and style of messages about policy priorities, we can
argue this is a benefit to us as citizens. The media and elites are helping us to digest the huge
number of bills introduced each year and to target the ones they think are of highest importance
and impact to us.
We also realize that the government uses the media as a partner to help us focus on the
policies it thinks are the most important and need the most urgent attention. While we count on
the media to provide fair and unbiased news, we must realize that the government drives much of
what impacts us in our world, so the media will often cover what the government says is
important. The media help to educate us on the issues so we can make our own value judgments
about supporting or rejecting legislation through our elected officials. This study also provides
evidence to support Sellers’ (2009) cycle of information whereby the elites set the agenda, the
elites communicate to the public, the media intercepts this communication and shares it more
broadly, and the elites look back to the media for a measure of public opinion and reaction from
the opposition. The media serves an important role in bundling information for us in neat
packages that we can understand and use to make judgments for our democracy.
From Sellers’ model, we can extrapolate a model of how the White House sets the
agenda. We can argue that the White House tweets are the agenda builders while the media are
the agenda setters (Baran & Davis, 2012). Tweets help provide elite opinion—the agenda—to
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the media, and the media, in turn, provide that agenda to the public. We know that agenda setting
is most effective when the media agenda aligns with the public agenda (Scheufele, 2000). Seeing
the White House’s content come around again in the media helps the White House to more fairly
acknowledge it as broad, favorable public opinion. They are then able to use this to show support
for their priority to the masses in the circuitous process that is agenda- and frame-setting.
While agenda setting could be seen as undue elite and media influence, it can also lead to
positive, democratic participation. The media agenda increases an issue’s salience, and can
create resonance with the public around a matter of important civic concern. Issues that are more
personal and issues that are more frequently discussed have higher salience, which is positively
correlated with engagement and activism (Cutlip et al., 2006). Arguably, agenda building and
agenda setting are normatively desired in our democracy.
Because of the media’s impact in priming criteria for discerning judgments, the media
have inadvertently developed social consensus around judgment criteria. “The media, by
providing an agenda that everyone, to a considerable degree, can share, create a sense of
community. This is, of course, a social function that is threatened by the expanding choice of
information sources created by the plethora of new communication technologies” (McCombs &
Shaw, 1993, 64).
Ironically, the choice of Twitter for these studies may have given a unique glimpse into
what McCombs and Shaw were forewarning (1993). While I chose Twitter to be able to study a
larger timeframe of content under more political circumstances, I did not take into enough
consideration the implications the medium itself would have on the agenda setting and framing
process.
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Ironically, the short content I chose, which helped me analyze a larger sample, may have
exposed a particular practice in framing—reliance on extremes. Entman (1993) theorizes that
frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies.
Messages now have simpler problems, clearer causes, easier solutions. Extremes may be helpful
to advance policy priorities, but they may not contribute enough understanding to the democratic
process of civil discourse about an issue. Communicators actively participate in framing as they
decide how to characterize an issue in line with their personal belief systems (Entman, 1993).
Twitter gives them the ability to simplify the issue for the sake of tweet length. It also somewhat
relieves them of the public’s normatively desired knowledge of the source of the information
they are transmitting; there simply aren’t enough characters to cite a source. The public shows a
need for neatly packaged information about issues, and cues are shown to be effective in tying an
important issue to innate ideologies (Zaller, 1992; Lupia, 1994); Twitter does both. It requires
quick digests and short, strategic use of language to frame an issue.
The pace of tweeting encourages users to issue content immediately, and changes the
news gathering and news issuing process. Twitter accelerates the media’s desire—and in similar
fashion, communicators’—to outpace one another in breaking a story. Because tweets are limited
to 140 characters, it changes this competition because it limits how tweets can be framed.
Communicators must decide if immediacy or framing is most important. How quickly can you
compose a tweet that addresses all four factors of framing for an issue? It doesn’t always lend
itself to a nuanced, well-researched appreciation of all the issue’s factors that framing aims to
articulate and make salient.
We, instead, see a stronger focus on certain of Fairhurst and Sarr’s (1996) elements of
framing rather than others: metaphors; stories; traditions; jargon, slogans, and catchphrases;
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artifacts; contrasts; and spin. Communicators can increasingly rely on certain of these elements
because they can easily work into the 140-character limit. The White House frequently used
slogans and catchphrases, particularly in their choice and repeated use of hashtags. We also saw
it in sarcasm that opposed the Republicans. Metaphors and contrasts might be easier to use
because short comparisons that show likeness and difference may still be quite effective, but
storytelling is substantially more difficult to do in 140 characters. Spin, or the imbuing of a value
judgment, can be done in a tweet. The others—stories, traditions, artifacts—may be better left to
best practices of visual communication. This is the only way to present more than 140
characters—to do so through a graphic, embedded video, or a link. To some extent, we must
draw more on the principles of effective advertising and visual communication to develop best
practices for framing in Twitter.
As communicators, we can see the vast importance agenda-setting theory and priming
have on our practice. Whatever it is we might be trying to advance, helping to focus the public
on the important issues, and so to filter out the rest of the messages; providing the public
information in an organized fashion that is useful to people who are bombarded by messages;
and using classic tactics that appeal to emotion are critical to achieving our goals.
Communications challenges require us to address both emotion and reason (Lakoff, 2008;
Westen 2007), combining both aims in our messages for greatest impact, just as the White House
often combined tactics of propaganda and public information (emotion and reason) to advance
successful adoption of the PPACA and to overturn initial negative opinion. Failing to address the
emotional aspects of issues will increase the odds of messages falling flat and failing to draw the
response we seek.
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We also learn from the White House the importance of repetition in setting the agenda.
The White House talked about healthcare reform approximately 10% of the time on Twitter.
Considering the vast number of policies under consideration in any given term, talking about a
single issue in one of every ten tweets was risky, but it was necessary to help both the media and
the public understand how important this policy was to the administration. We must be
persistent.
Finally, we must be ethical in our practice, but we should not be wary of using trendy,
kitchy techniques. We have to meet our audience where they are. As I said earlier, facts and
figures might not be what convinces someone to get a flu shot. Instead, a contest or the
validation of a celebrity may be what helps someone get the shot. If the aim in public health is to
increase adoption of that particular health practice, however, as long as we are within ethical
bounds of the profession, we should be open to using the full scale of effective strategies and
tactics to achieve the communications goal.
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APPENDIX A
STUDY 1 CODE BOOK
1. From which Twitter account was the post issued?
2. Does the tweet relate to healthcare reform?
• yes=1, no=0
3. Is the tweet original content or a Retweet?
• original=1, RT=0
4. Does the tweet support the in-party (Democrats)?
• yes=1, no=0
5. Does the tweet oppose the in-party (Democrats)?
• yes=1, no=0
6. Does the tweet oppose the out-party (Republicans)?
• yes=1, no=0
7. Does the tweet support the out-party (Republicans)?
• yes=1, no=0
8. What is the tweet’s tone?
• 0=negative; 1=positive; 2=neutral; 3=balanced
9. Does the tweet reference a candidate (local, state, federal)?
• yes=1, no=0
10. Does the tweet reference a policy (local, state, federal)?
• yes=1, no=0
11. Does the tweet use testimonials?
• yes=1, no=0
12. Does the tweet cite numerical statistics?
• yes=1, no=0
13. Does the tweet use the word “Obamacare”?
• yes=1, no=0
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APPENDIX B
STUDY 2 EXEMPLAR TWEETS
Super
Category
provision of
information
for the
public good

Category

Subcategory 1

Subcategory 2

announcements
re open
enrollment

---

---

discussion of
provision

plan provisions

economic
benefits

improved
100

Exemplar Tweet

12/23/2013 16:45
If you need affordable
health coverage, here’s
where you can sign up
today to #GetCovered
starting January 1st →
http://t.co/wXgAInRrA
t
medical
01/29/2014 02:55
provisions
Obama on Obamacare:
“Because of this law,
no American can ever
again be dropped or
denied coverage for a
preexisting condition.”
#GetCovered
coverage
10/30/2013 20:11
provisions
President Obama:
"Young people can stay
on their parents’ plans
until they turn 26."
#Obamacare
for individuals
03/21/2014 17:29
Thanks to the #ACA,
millions of Americans
can #GetCoveredNow
for $100/month or less
→
http://t.co/PLARIHrqK
c,
http://t.co/ZRE3XtT6Y
Q
for government
11/20/2013 18:05
FACT: The Affordable
Care Act will reduce
our deficit by about
$100 billion over 10
years according to the
nonpartisan CBO.
#Obamacare
--03/25/2015 14:45

service delivery

goal setting/goal
clarification

---

---

transparency
with ordinary
citizens

accountability,
website fixes,
and call centers

---

Speeches

---

Q&As

---
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"It’s a major reason
we’ve seen 50,000
fewer preventable
patient deaths in
hospitals." —President
Obama
#BetterWithObamacare
12/02/2013 20:09
RT @DagVega44
.@Simas44: "This is
about making sure
anyone who wants
quality health insurance
can get it at an
affordable price."
http://t.co/fgrvvlVd11
10/30/2013 20:13
"I take full
responsibility for
making sure it gets
fixed ASAP." —
President Obama on
http://t.co/GNfbftrfo3
#Obamacare
#GetCovered
10/21/2013 15:51
Obama: "We’ve also
added more staff to the
call centers where you
can apply for insurance
over the phone." Call:
1-800-318-2596
#GetCovered
10/21/2013 14:53
Don’t miss President
Obama speak about
#Obamacare and
http://t.co/Gnfbftrfo3.
Watch at 11:25am ET:
http://t.co/KvadYk9atb
#GetCovered
03/23/12 16:25
Have Qs on what the
health care law means
for you & your family?

ease of use

---

asking others to
share info re
enrollment

---

appeal to
mothers

using sourced
facts

---

---
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We're holding #ACA
Office Hrs @ 2ET
http://t.co/6S4eIdXg
Ask now: #WHChat
9/30/13 16:15
Worth a RT: Thanks to
#Obamacare, signing
up for health insurance
just got 17 pages easier
—>
http://t.co/wh6d6zyfcH
#GetCovered
02/05/2015 15:53
RT to spread the word:
You’ve got 10 days to
sign up for 2015 health
coverage →
http://t.co/GNfbft9Ewv
#GetCovered
http://t.co/TW38mqYh
bX
02/06/2015 18:34
Make sure your friends
know: There are just 9
days left to sign up for
2015 health coverage
→
http://t.co/rNzHK5zFEl
http://t.co/qEIKAC575
N
03/24/2014 20:21
RT @JLo Join my
mom and @FLOTUS
in helping kids
#GetCovered by March
31
http://t.co/awciXwwO
X9! Click here:
http://t.co/aCGPG6eKi
v #YourMomCares
03/10/2014 15:28
FACT: The U.S.
uninsured rate
continues to drop:
http://t.co/SzinLjEpfm

RT to help even more
Americans
#GetCovered →
http://t.co/5zeR2RQuX
e
propaganda

using unsourced
facts

---

---

using facts
sourced to the
White House/
administration

---

---

calls to action

citizens

---

Officials

---

fear/anxiety
appeals

---

reasons to get
covered
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(sourced to Gallup)
11/8/13 18:54
Obama: #Obamacare
"allows states to
expand Medicaid to
cover more of their
citizens. Here in
Louisiana that would
benefit...265,000
people."
04/04/2014 21:15
FACT: Thanks to the
Affordable Care Act,
Kentucky has seen a
40% drop in its
uninsured rate since
Oct 1.
http://t.co/P2LyRXGtR
H #GetCovered
(sourced to HHS)
9/26/13 15:25
Obama: “Tell your
friends, tell your
classmates, and tell
your family members
about their new health
care choices.”
http://t.co/Gnfbftrfo3
9/23/13 18:32
The House GOP should
stop trying to prevent
millions from getting
health insurance & start
helping the middle
class:
http://t.co/oEvMfGENg
1
02/24/2014 20:35
RT @Simas44 Obama
on @John_Dingell:

peace of mind

for you

for your
mother

dominant
language

leading intros

---

American
idealism

---
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"He helped give
millions of families the
peace of mind of
knowing they won’t
lose everything if they
get sick." #ACA
07/10/2014 17:59
Obama: "The
Affordable Care Act
has given millions
more families peace of
mind that they won’t
go broke just because
they get sick."
12/12/13 20:30
#GetCovered because
your mom will have
peace of mind (and you
will as well).
http://t.co/GNfbftrfo3,
http://t.co/AP3HLgeQB
V
9/17/13 16:33
RT @Jordan44 For
GOP, is yielding to this
fringe viewpoint of
undermining
#Obamacare really
worth recklessly
hurting the economy?
http://t.co/FpLryJw0rD
02/17/2015 23:31
BREAKING: About
11.4 million Americans
are signed up for
private health coverage.
#11MillionAndCountin
g #ACAWorks
https://t.co/1zKLkyJvlo
06/25/2015 15:52
"This was a good day
for America." —
@POTUS on the
Supreme Court
upholding a critical part
of the Affordable Care

Act
http://t.co/PHjhhCe06p
01/04/2015 17:00
"We think everyone in
America has a right to
have adequate health
care insurance." —
@VP:
http://t.co/XzEms0WJ
AL #ACAWorks
#GetCovered
04/17/2014 20:22
"We are a nation that
does what is hard.
What is necessary.
What is right." —
Obama signing the
ACA #TBT #8Million
http://t.co/t4lQlusjbt

Sarcasm

---

opining

---
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10/21/13 16:02
Obama: "Health care is
not a privilege for a
fortunate few, but a
right for all to enjoy &
I intend to deliver on
that promise."
#Obamacare
10/31/13 15:30
Karmel's story: "I no
longer fear my 'preexisting condition.'"
http://t.co/WfwjZnNyp
A #ThanksObamacare
9/24/13 18:19
#DefundObamacare if
you believe women
should be charged more
than men for the same
health coverage.
#EnoughAlready
9/13/13 14:57
RT @Simas44 This is

worth a RT. Millions of
these ACA stories are
about to be told. Health
care act a lifesaver to
Indiana women.
http://t.co/li95aqQqlQ
opposing outparty

---

(emphasis ours)
7/11/13 13:37
RT @Simas44 Latest
from GOP? Deny the ¼
of Americans under 65
with pre-existing
conditions any shot at
affordable health care.
http://t.co/rmUZWuhqg
U
9/20/13 17:06
Defund #Obamacare if
you want to prevent
millions of uninsured
Americans from getting
affordable health
insurance.
#EnoughAlready

success
claiming

---

9/30/13 20:39
FACT: House
Republicans would
rather #shutdown the
government than help
millions of Americans
afford health insurance.
9/4/13 16:24
"This law's already
done a lot of good...it
has lots of
opportunities for states
to innovate." —
President @BillClinton
on #Obamacare
8/21/13 16:51
RT @HealthCareTara
This headline speaks
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for itself - NBC: Even
Republican young
adults want health
insurance, poll finds:
http://t.co/TReF46L8l3
5/15/13 17:30
In case you missed it,
health care reform is
causing insurers to
lower rates through
competition:
http://t.co/TdVAy5mDs
o #Obamacares
relating to
average citizens

third-party
validation

Stereotypes

---

forced news
values

---

Citizens

numbers of
calls, web
visits,
applications

testimonials
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02/05/2014 21:04
RT @NancyPelosi
Mom jeans, pant suits,
whatever your mom
prefers, rest assured
she’ll love to see you
#getcovered:
http://t.co/ZI6xdBR9a9
5/10/2013 17:40
FACT: Thanks to
health care reform,
insurance companies
won’t be able to charge
women more than men
for the same coverage.
#HappyMothersDay
10/21/13 15:43
President Obama:
"More than half a
million consumers
across the country have
successfully submitted
applications."
#GetCovered
#Obamacare
10/30/13 15:04
Great story: Thanks to
#Obamacare, a
Pittsburgh woman with
diabetes cut her

Celebrities

---

Media

---

elected officials

---

monthly premium by
more than $500 —>
http://t.co/x1supcMye
W
03/20/2014 16:37
RT @jasoncollins34
Don’t let huge medical
bills keep you on the
bench. Make sure you
sign up for health
coverage.
http://t.co/mjoUu14Uc2
#GetCoveredNow
03/28/2014 15:45
“Obamacare’s amazing
comeback” —
@CNNMoney on the
#6MillionAndCounting
who have signed up for
coverage:
http://t.co/IzRaUQAtpT
09/01/2015 18:08
RT
@AkGovBillWalker
Today is Day 1 of the
Healthy AK Plan,
which will help
Alaskans access
healthcare they need.
http://1.usa.gov/1JKFQ
NR
06/25/2015 20:29
RT @JohnDingell It's
not often you can be
proud of posting a #tbt,
but today is no ordinary
Thursday. Thank you,
@POTUS.
http://t.co/owQgJS0jYc
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APPENDIX C
STUDY 2 CODE BOOK
Code
action—citizens
action—enrollmentmoms*
action—enrollment
action—officials
average citizen

average citizen—news
values*
average citizen—
stereotypes*
dominance
dominance—intros*
dominance—opining*

dominance—sarcasm*
dominance—American
idealism*
dominance—opposing
out-party*
dominance—success
claiming*
enrollment
provisions—business

Observed Tactics
encouraging citizens to share good news about the ACA—savings,
medical provisions, access/availability—to extend favorability for
the law.
encouraging moms to share the news about enrollment with their
families, children
encouraging citizens to share with family and friends so they don’t
miss the open enrollment period
encouraging elected officials to take action to prevent repeal, to
continue success of ACA, to act to pass a budget that did not
impact ACA, etc.
relating to the average citizen by referencing Barack Obama’s
struggling single mother while he was growing up, referencing life
paycheck to paycheck, incenting people with contests, using cute
animal photos, etc.
creating news values (relevance, timeliness, etc.) by using current
events, holidays, etc.
appealing to stereotypes, particularly of moms and children, e.g.,
nervous moms, parents not being tech savvy, children not paying
attention to deadlines or not seeing importance of healthcare, etc.
use of dramatic adjectives, use of strong emotion
use of introductions that set up talk of the ACA in supportive
terms, "FACT," "breaking," "good/great news" and the like
overgeneralizing or submitting opinion as fact about what may
happen in the future, what motivated actions of others in the
present, reasons and causes behind action that are not factual or
proven; broadly, opinions that support the ACA
using sarcasm or inside jokes, seen in hashtags like
#ThanksObamacare or #RepealObamacare, etc.
discussion of American vision/values, talking about America in
normative terms re healthcare access., discussion of Obama’s
philosophy that healthcare is a right, not a privilege
levying allegations that the out-party doesn’t have Americans’ best
interest at heart, alleging that the out-party is defying the
American public’s wishes or normatively desired access to
healthcare
boasting in-party dominance: “ACA is here to stay,” claiming
success for outcomes that may relate to the ACA, generalizing
from ACA success to other Executive successes or overall
American prosperity
discussion of open enrollment beginning and ending dates;
discussion of number of remaining days to enroll
discussion of benefits to small businesses, or discussion of less109

economic benefit*
provisions—coverage*
provisions—improved
quality of care*
provisions—slowing
healthcare costs*
provisions—government
economic benefit*
provisions—
improvements to service
delivery*
provisions—medical
provisions—personal
economic benefit*
reasons to get covered—
fear/anxiety

reasons to get covered—
peace of mind—for you*
reasons to get covered—
peace of mind—for your
mom*
sourced facts
sourced facts attributed to
WH or administration*
transparency—ease of
use*
transparency—Q&As
transparency—speeches
transparency—web and
calls

unsourced facts
validation—citizens—
traffic*
validation—citizens-testimonials

than-GOP-portrayed negative impacts to small businesses
discussion of coverage provisions (staying on parents' policy until
age 26, getting coverage in career changes, etc.)
discussion of reduction in medical errors
discussion of how healthcare costs are slowing, growth is at lowest
level in a number of years, etc.
discussion of positive changes to government economics (paying
down national debt, decrease of national deficit), discussion of
how healthcare costs are slowing, growth is at lowest level in a
number of years, etc.
discussion of improved service delivery (cost savings for better
care)
discussion of medical provisions (preventative care, screenings,
preexisting conditions, etc.)
discussion of positive changes to personal economics (monthly
savings, annual savings, co-pay savings, prescription savings)
using fear/anxiety cues to motivate people to get covered by
disussing costs of procedures, visits, or hospitalizations without
insurance, discussing anxiety of not knowing what may happen if
you aren't covered, discussing financial ruin caused by lack of
coverage; "people shouldn't go broke because they get sick"
convincing people to get covered so they have peace of mind
convincing people to get covered so their moms have peace of
mind
use of facts with attribution
use of facts sourced back to the White House or administrative
units
disucssing how easy it is to get coverage via website, calls, visits
to local groups registering citizens, paper forms
announcing availability for web chat to answer questions
announcing speeches and public statements by president and other
admin officials
disucssing the website failure (even just acknowledging it) and
steps being taken to remedy the site; discussing the call centers
supporting a broken site that could not handle peak traffic;
discussing post-website fix accommodated users (site visits, call
volume, etc.)
use of facts with no attribution
implied validation shown in number of citizens who have visited
the website, called a call center, applied for coverage
testimonials from citizens providing success stories about the
ACA
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validation—media
validation—officials*

sharing favorable media coverage that supports the law or helps to
explain its benefits
sharing support of elected officials who speak out about the law

*Added after emergent coding codebook was established based on repeated observations that did
not fit existing codes. May have been in original category, but demonstrated need to separate into
a subcategory based on number of observations.
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